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SEC-3: secrets threat model + reviewer FAQ (docs only) #54

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Check · Review · Land done · Live — Landed; nothing deploys from this branch, so this is the end of its path.

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Doc-only. Adds docs/security/secrets-threat-model.md so a reviewer can state what decrypts what, who sees plaintext & when, how rotation/backup work, and why Vault is deferred — without reading source.

Notes

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SEC-3 (roadmap #45): secrets threat model + reviewer FAQ

Doc-only. Adds docs/security/secrets-threat-model.md so a reviewer can state what decrypts what, who sees plaintext & when, how rotation/backup work, and why Vault is deferred — without reading source.

Covers (all anchored to real code):

  • Sovereignty invariant — every clusters/** sops value sealed to the one fork key; enforced empirically by fork_verify_all_sealed (bin/lib.sh:338). Includes a "what decrypts what" table.
  • Plaintext exposure windows — exactly three: operator workstation at seal time (bin/lib.sh:180/207), the transient admin-run sync-env CI job (_app-template/.forgejo/workflows/sync-env.yml:100, mcp/src/secrets-cli.ts → syncAppEnv mcp/src/server.ts:1829), and the running app pod. Nowhere else (Forgejo secrets are write-only).
  • dev/prod PLAT_DEV boundary — prod-only vs agent-readable dev overlay (mcp/src/secrets-cli.ts:141, mcp/src/server.ts:1892/1911).
  • Rotation/backup posture (post-SEC-1) — custody gate fork_backup_key (bin/lib.sh:681), lock-out-safe rotate_age_key (bin/lib.sh:809).
  • Vault non-decision — moves+multiplies the SPOF, adds stateful risk, breaks self-replication; revisit triggers: multi-operator quorum, secret TTLs, dynamic/leased creds.

Closes #45.

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