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coldstart: gate host germination on Forgejo's trust verdict, not on a username #119
Check · Review · Land done · Live — Landed; nothing deploys from this branch, so this is the end of its path.
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The coldstart job runs PR-head code as host code on the vxrail box that also serves production, and the only thing in front of it was an allowlist of three username strings.
A username is not a durable identity on this instance. Forgejo frees a name for re-registration the instant an account is deleted (no tombstone, no cooldown), and it cannot reserve one —
RESERVED_USER_NAMESis not a real Forgejo config key at all, verified against the 15.0.6 binary. Deleteci-botand a stranger can register the name and satisfy the gate.This adds a fail-closed first step that asks Forgejo instead of trusting a name. Forgejo withholds every Actions secret from a run it considers untrusted, and it forces that verdict for AGit PRs as well as forks — precisely the case the existing comment worried a
.forktest would miss. So a non-empty secret is a server-side, ID-backed statement that the head branch lives in this repo and was pushed with write access. Username squatting cannot produce one.The allowlist stays as a cheap first filter.
Verified this breaks nothing: every coldstart PR to date, from
platandci-botalike, is a standard in-repo branch PR (flow=0,head_repo_id = base_repo_id), so secrets are in scope and the gate passes. Uses a dedicatedTRUSTED_RUN_CANARYrepo secret so the check is not coupled to an unrelated credential's lifecycle.This PR exercises the new gate on itself.
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