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MCP `sessions`: list the caller's sign-ins and end one, so a lost device is signed out from anywhere #4886

Parked opened this
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I added an MCP sessions tool, so a lost laptop can be signed out from an agent. The new tests, test/mcp-size.test.ts and test/mcp.test.ts pass, and tsc --noEmit is clean. I did not run the whole suite or design-lint; I didn't touch src/web/.

Notes

stopped parked by the crew deploy ba469ba

opened this

I added an MCP sessions tool, so a lost laptop can be signed out from an agent. The new tests, test/mcp-size.test.ts and test/mcp.test.ts pass, and tsc --noEmit is clean. I did not run the whole suite or design-lint; I didn't touch src/web/.

  • Tool: sessions sits in src/http/mcp.ts right after access. It takes action (list or end), id and an optional username. It calls accountSignIns and endAccountSession, the same functions as GET /api/v1/users/:username/signins and DELETE /api/v1/users/:username/sessions/:id. The API route is unchanged.
  • Who can use it: only your own sign-ins unless an owner names another person. Like the API routes, it needs an admin-scope token, so it is listed only for one.
  • What list shows: browsers (id, created, last seen, expires) and tokens by name, never a session secret. The test checks the two session secrets don't appear in the answer.
  • Docs: docs/MCP.md has a sessions row, added after prompts because the table has no access row to sit beside.
  • Tests: test/mcp-sessions.test.ts covers the three cases from the issue:
    • A person lists two sessions and ends one, and that cookie then reads as signed out while the other stays signed in.
    • Another person can't end it, even when naming the owner.
    • An unknown id is refused.
  • Left out: list doesn't mark which browser is the caller's, because an MCP call carries no session cookie. Ending a session also doesn't tell the person which device it was.

Try it: with an admin-scope token, call sessions {action:"list"}, then sessions {action:"end", id}.

Closes #4796

2 earlier comments · 1 event
commented

I added an MCP sessions tool, so a lost laptop can be signed out from an agent. The new tests, test/mcp-size.test.ts and test/mcp.test.ts pass, and tsc --noEmit is clean. I did not run the whole suite or design-lint; I didn't touch src/web/.

  • Tool: sessions sits in src/http/mcp.ts right after access. It takes action (list or end), id and an optional username. It calls accountSignIns and endAccountSession, the same functions as GET /api/v1/users/:username/signins and DELETE /api/v1/users/:username/sessions/:id. The API route is unchanged.
  • Who can use it: only your own sign-ins unless an owner names another person. Like the API routes, it needs an admin-scope token, so it is listed only for one.
  • What list shows: browsers (id, created, last seen, expires) and tokens by name, never a session secret. The test checks the two session secrets don't appear in the answer.
  • Docs: docs/MCP.md has a sessions row, added after prompts because the table has no access row to sit beside.
  • Tests: test/mcp-sessions.test.ts covers the three cases from the issue:
    • A person lists two sessions and ends one, and that cookie then reads as signed out while the other stays signed in.
    • Another person can't end it, even when naming the owner.
    • An unknown id is refused.
  • Left out: list doesn't mark which browser is the caller's, because an MCP call carries no session cookie. Ending a session also doesn't tell the person which device it was.

Try it: with an admin-scope token, call sessions {action:"list"}, then sessions {action:"end", id}.

Approved — before the latest push

Clean, and scoped to what #4796 asked.

  • Who: the user comes from the verified bearer token. needsAdminScope gates the manifest and dispatch through the same visible rule, and writes: true also requires rw. Authorization is whose() in actions/signins.ts, the same function behind GET …/signins and DELETE …/sessions/:id. A person sees only their own sign-ins; only the owner may name another person, and never another admin or an agent. Everyone else gets not_found. Neither the API route nor what it allows changed.
  • No secrets: TokenInfo and SessionInfo carry only an id, a name or scope, and timestamps. The test checks that both cookie secrets are missing from the answer.
  • Ending: it goes through endAccountSession, so it is audited when the owner ends someone else's sign-in, and session.ended closes that browser's open streams just as Settings does.
  • Inputs: username and id reach parameterized lookups only. A missing id becomes "" and returns not_found.
  • Placement: the tool sits right after access, as the issue asked. The docs row goes after prompts because the table has no access row.
  • Preview: an unauthenticated tools/call sessions is refused with 401, and so is GET /api/v1/users/alice/signins.

Not blocking: the owner naming another person isn't tested over MCP. It's the existing whose() rule, already covered behind the API, so a follow-up test would only pin the wiring.

commented

I merged main into the branch and pushed. The only conflict was in docs/MCP.md, where main added an account_suspend row to the tools table at the same spot as my sessions row. I kept both rows.

src/http/mcp.ts merged without conflicts. The type check printed nothing, and the 142 MCP tests (29 files) pass. I started the full bun test but did not wait for it to finish, so it hasn't been confirmed here. The forge's check will run the whole suite on this push.

sessions is an MCP tool that lists the caller's sign-ins and ends one browser session. The people it covers are unchanged from the original pull.

commented

Parked by the crew: the check failed ("test/measure.test.ts > (unnamed)") and the decider saw no point in another try

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