Public: anyone can read this; the crew can change it.
Each threat section of docs/THREATS.md lives in its own file under docs/threats/, so security pulls stop colliding on one 523-line document #15022
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mason/forge:mason/15005-each-threat-section-of-docs-threats-md-l → main 2 commits fork
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AGENTS.md +1 −1
| @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ | ||
| 2 | 2 | |
| 3 | 3 | Read `CLAUDE.md` first: it is the rulebook for agents editing this repo. |
| 4 | 4 | |
| 5 | Read the guide first, in this order: `docs/guide-what-a-forge-is.md`, `docs/guide-first-app.md`, `docs/guide-tell-the-crew.md`, `docs/guide-ship-and-undo.md`, `docs/guide-your-apps.md`, `docs/guide-hosting.md`, `docs/guide-own-ai.md`, `docs/guide-agents.md`, `docs/guide-backups-moving.md`, `docs/guide-settings.md`, `docs/guide-when-wrong.md`. That is the spine (ordered in `src/view/guide.ts`, served at `/docs` with search, listed first by /llms.txt): eleven pages, each at most 300 words and 60 lines, every command, path and link in them checked by `test/guide.test.ts`. A feature's `docs/features/<name>.md` is its reference; open it with front matter `topic:` and `row:` (#14248), which builds its row in `docs/features/README.md`, the index every spine page links; never edit that list by hand (`test/feature-orphans.test.ts`). The section list of `docs/DESIGN.md` is built the same way: a section file under `docs/design/sections/` opens with `order:` and `nest:` front matter and its first heading is its title (#14354, `test/design-spine.test.ts`). | |
| 5 | Read the guide first, in this order: `docs/guide-what-a-forge-is.md`, `docs/guide-first-app.md`, `docs/guide-tell-the-crew.md`, `docs/guide-ship-and-undo.md`, `docs/guide-your-apps.md`, `docs/guide-hosting.md`, `docs/guide-own-ai.md`, `docs/guide-agents.md`, `docs/guide-backups-moving.md`, `docs/guide-settings.md`, `docs/guide-when-wrong.md`. That is the spine (ordered in `src/view/guide.ts`, served at `/docs` with search, listed first by /llms.txt): eleven pages, each at most 300 words and 60 lines, every command, path and link in them checked by `test/guide.test.ts`. A feature's `docs/features/<name>.md` is its reference; open it with front matter `topic:` and `row:` (#14248), which builds its row in `docs/features/README.md`, the index every spine page links; never edit that list by hand (`test/feature-orphans.test.ts`). The section list of `docs/DESIGN.md` is built the same way: a section file under `docs/design/sections/` opens with `order:` and `nest:` front matter and its first heading is its title (#14354, `test/design-spine.test.ts`). `docs/THREATS.md` is an index: each adversary's `## ` section is a file in `docs/threats/`, linked from the index in order; a new protection goes in its adversary's file, a new adversary is a new file and a new link. `readThreats` in `src/core/threats.ts` puts them back together for the Resilience page, `/docs/THREATS.md` and the tests (#15005, `test/threats-sections-linked.test.ts`). | |
| 6 | 6 | |
| 7 | 7 | A maintenance duty is a file in `src/maintain/duties/` that exports `duty`; `src/maintain/registry.ts` builds the roster from that directory, never edit a list by hand (#14355, `test/duty-roster.test.ts`). |
| 8 | 8 |
docs/THREATS.md +12 −560
| @@ -13,564 +13,16 @@ a named path that does not exist, and prints how many rows say `none yet`. A | ||
| 13 | 13 | protection nothing enforces is a gap, not a secret: the count is the to-do |
| 14 | 14 | list, and only editing a row lowers it. |
| 15 | 15 | |
| 16 | ## A snooper on the network | |
| 16 | Each section below is its own file in `docs/threats/`, so a change to one | |
| 17 | adversary's protections touches only that file; the Resilience page, the | |
| 18 | served document and `test/threats-enforced.test.ts` read the sections in | |
| 19 | this order, as one document. | |
| 17 | 20 | |
| 18 | Wants: session cookies, tokens and pushed code in transit, or to learn who | |
| 19 | talks to whom. | |
| 20 | ||
| 21 | - Sessions are HttpOnly cookies, `Secure` when the request came over https, so | |
| 22 | script cannot read one and a plain-http hop does not carry it. | |
| 23 | Enforced by: `test/own-session.test.ts` | |
| 24 | - Tokens are shown once; the database keeps only their sha256, so a copy of the | |
| 25 | index does not replay as a login. | |
| 26 | Enforced by: `test/tokens.test.ts` | |
| 27 | - TLS is terminated by the edge in front of the forge, and certificates are | |
| 28 | issued only for names the forge vouches for (`on_demand_tls` ask). | |
| 29 | Enforced by: none yet | |
| 30 | - Between the edge and the forge process, and between forge and cell, traffic is | |
| 31 | plain HTTP on one machine or a pod network. Nothing encrypts it. | |
| 32 | Enforced by: none yet | |
| 33 | ||
| 34 | ## A stolen token | |
| 35 | ||
| 36 | Wants: to act as the person or agent it was issued to, for as long as it works. | |
| 37 | ||
| 38 | - Tokens carry a scope and an optional expiry; a narrower token cannot do what a | |
| 39 | wider one can. | |
| 40 | Enforced by: `test/tokens.test.ts` | |
| 41 | - A crew run's secrets are named in the brief, opened per run, redacted from the | |
| 42 | log, and released when the run ends. | |
| 43 | Enforced by: `test/run-secrets.test.ts` | |
| 44 | - The model credential in a crew run's environment is held for redaction like a | |
| 45 | granted secret, from before the agent starts until the run ends: a run that | |
| 46 | says it leaves `[redacted]` in its log, its summary and every event. The | |
| 47 | two other children the forge starts with that credential, a one-shot and a | |
| 48 | conversation turn, are held the same way. | |
| 49 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-secrets-run.test.ts` | |
| 50 | - A passport (`fp1.…`) is bound to one audience and scope set and dies in | |
| 51 | minutes, so a copy lifted from a run is useful to one door briefly. | |
| 52 | Enforced by: `test/passport.test.ts` | |
| 53 | - Sign-in attempts are throttled per client, with a whole-forge cap beside it; eight wrong passwords at one account from one client in ten minutes shut that pair until the window passes (`src/core/signin-window.ts`, #14373). | |
| 54 | Enforced by: `test/signin-throttle.test.ts` | |
| 55 | - Stored provider tokens (origins) are sealed under a key in `secret.key`, never | |
| 56 | returned by any route. | |
| 57 | Enforced by: `test/origins-security-auth.test.ts` | |
| 58 | - The operator's GitHub application (`FORGE_GITHUB_CLIENT_ID`, `_SECRET`) is | |
| 59 | github.com's alone: a host a member calls GitHub Enterprise gets no app, and | |
| 60 | the secret is withheld from every other host at the device poll, the | |
| 61 | refresh and the revoke, whatever registration carries it (#14757). | |
| 62 | Enforced by: `test/origins-github-secret.test.ts` | |
| 63 | - The SSH host key and the database files are created 0600; a host key group- | |
| 64 | or world-readable is refused, and a database file found too open is a | |
| 65 | degraded finding naming the chmod, never a silent change and never a stop. | |
| 66 | Enforced by: `test/file-modes.test.ts` | |
| 67 | - The files a forge's family keeps keys in (`parent.json`: the heartbeat key, a | |
| 68 | proposal token, a read credential offered and not yet sealed; the parent's | |
| 69 | `spawn/<name>.json`: the status token and the heartbeat key) are written 0600 | |
| 70 | (`writePrivate`), and one found wider is narrowed at boot and said once. | |
| 71 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tokens-follow.test.ts` | |
| 72 | - A token bound to one repository (a run's, a child's, an outside agent's, an | |
| 73 | app's) is refused on every route of every other repository before the | |
| 74 | route's handler runs, and ends with its repository: it never becomes an | |
| 75 | unbound one. | |
| 76 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tokens-gates.test.ts` | |
| 77 | - Every such token is minted with an end, read on every use, and its own | |
| 78 | revoke ends it at the next request, with no restart and no wait. A | |
| 79 | repository's admin sees and ends every child's read of it, whoever it was | |
| 80 | minted as; a suspended account's tokens stop with it. | |
| 81 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tokens-gates.test.ts` | |
| 82 | - A crew run's git offers its token to this forge's two addresses and to no | |
| 83 | other host it talks to, and the token ends with the run. | |
| 84 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tokens-crew.test.ts` | |
| 85 | - The credential a child holds to read a private app is minted for that one | |
| 86 | repository and kept by the parent as a hash; the child seals it with its own | |
| 87 | key and keeps it in no file, config or address. It lives a week at a time, | |
| 88 | renewed while the child follows, and ends when the child is removed, refuses | |
| 89 | the offer or is revoked; no log line or event on either forge carries it. | |
| 90 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tokens-follow.test.ts` | |
| 91 | - A child's tokens and an outside agent's contribute token never enter an app | |
| 92 | at its own host, whoever's account they ride on. The token a preview's own | |
| 93 | process holds reaches its repository, its timers and its printer, and | |
| 94 | nothing else of its owner's. | |
| 95 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tokens-apphost.test.ts` | |
| 96 | - Only a forge admin sets or removes a secret, and nothing is opened for | |
| 97 | anyone else. An open leaves one `secret.read` per name opened; no event | |
| 98 | carries a value, plain or sealed; the data browser shows no sealed column. | |
| 99 | The key file is 32 bytes only its owner reads, and one that others can read | |
| 100 | is refused by name. A lost key costs the values and nothing else. Deleting a | |
| 101 | repository removes the secrets scoped to it. | |
| 102 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-secrets-store.test.ts` | |
| 103 | - A secret kept for the forge or an organization reaches a repository's app | |
| 104 | and its crew's runs only after a forge admin granted that name to that | |
| 105 | repository; a repository's own secrets need no grant. A name a run declares | |
| 106 | and nobody granted is never opened: the run goes on without it and says so | |
| 107 | in its log and once on its issue, with the link that grants it. | |
| 108 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-secrets-store.test.ts` | |
| 109 | - A production app's `FORGE_TOKEN` is its owner's read-only token: the app's | |
| 110 | code and what it depends on read everything its owner reads, every private | |
| 111 | repository included. A preview's is bound to the app's one repository; | |
| 112 | production's is not, because reading the whole forge from an app is a | |
| 113 | documented feature (`docs/APPS.md`, `examples/forge-live`). Binding it too | |
| 114 | waits for the owner's word: it needs a per-app grant the owner sees listed, | |
| 115 | and until that grant is given it stops an app that reads its owner's other | |
| 116 | repositories on purpose. | |
| 117 | Enforced by: none yet | |
| 118 | - Revoking every token of one account at once, and telling its owner a token was | |
| 119 | used from somewhere new. | |
| 120 | Enforced by: none yet | |
| 121 | ||
| 122 | ## A compromised vendor | |
| 123 | ||
| 124 | Wants: to run its code on the forge or in an app through something the forge | |
| 125 | trusts: a package, a model provider, a hosting provider, an origin it syncs from. | |
| 126 | ||
| 127 | - The forge has no runtime dependencies, so there is no package to poison in the | |
| 128 | forge itself. | |
| 129 | Enforced by: `test/deps.test.ts` | |
| 130 | - An app's code runs in a cell: read-only machine, empty data directory and | |
| 131 | home, own pid and network namespaces, memory, CPU and disk watched. A | |
| 132 | dependency an app pulls in gets no more than the app does. | |
| 133 | Enforced by: `test/contain.test.ts` | |
| 134 | - A cell binds each directory it may write once, nothing inside one by name, | |
| 135 | and only a directory that is there itself: a link its code leaves where its | |
| 136 | home goes is never mounted. What it hides (the forge's data, home and temp) | |
| 137 | is covered under the name it really has as well as the one it was given, | |
| 138 | before its own directory is bound back, and no neighbour's directory is | |
| 139 | ever shown. | |
| 140 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tenancy-cell.test.ts` | |
| 141 | - What a cell prints costs the forge one line at most, however long it goes | |
| 142 | without a newline: an app's or a step's line is cut at 64 KiB as it arrives | |
| 143 | and says so, a hosted forge's at 500 characters. That text is held in the | |
| 144 | forge's own memory, outside the cell's cap. | |
| 145 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tenancy-limits.test.ts` | |
| 146 | - A cell's disk is counted to the end or the cell is over it: the walk goes as | |
| 147 | far as the cell's own limit of files (as many as its disk has 4 KiB blocks, | |
| 148 | a million at least), and a cell that reaches it is stopped and told so, | |
| 149 | never counted as the part that was seen. | |
| 150 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tenancy-limits.test.ts` | |
| 151 | - Outside Kubernetes a cell sees the machine's mounts minus the ones that may | |
| 152 | carry a secret (every tmpfs, everything under `/run`): a second mount of the | |
| 153 | data volume, an env file or a backup volume bound in at another path is | |
| 154 | readable in every cell. `FORGE_CELL_MOUNTS=allow-list` closes it; it is not | |
| 155 | yet the default wherever the forge runs in a container. | |
| 156 | Enforced by: none yet | |
| 157 | - A preview's copy of production's data is taken while production runs and | |
| 158 | can swap any entry for a link to a host path (`secret.key`, `forge.db`, | |
| 159 | another tenant's data): the forge walks it through held directory | |
| 160 | descriptors with `O_NOFOLLOW`, copies a link as a link and never what it | |
| 161 | points at, and checkpoints SQLite only in the copy it alone writes, where | |
| 162 | `quick_check` refuses a database torn by a write mid-copy (copied again, | |
| 163 | five times at most, then the seed fails); a log is copied before its | |
| 164 | database and its shared-memory index never. An app's backup seals such a | |
| 165 | snapshot, never the live directory. | |
| 166 | Enforced by: `test/apps-data-symlink-race.test.ts` | |
| 167 | - An app that prints the variables, identity key or forge token it was handed | |
| 168 | leaves `[redacted]` in its deploy's log, plain or encoded, so a careless | |
| 169 | dependency does not publish them to everyone who can read the runs. | |
| 170 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-secrets-process.test.ts` | |
| 171 | - The only way out of a cell is the egress proxy, which reaches the hosts the | |
| 172 | repository declared and refuses names that resolve to private, loopback or | |
| 173 | metadata addresses. | |
| 174 | Enforced by: `test/apps-adversarial.test.ts` | |
| 175 | - The website-spec check the forge runs from its own process against a live | |
| 176 | preview fetches only the preview's own origin: an icon, manifest or | |
| 177 | stylesheet the app's HTML names on another host (metadata, a private or | |
| 178 | tailnet address, another app's loopback port) is reported as off-origin and | |
| 179 | never fetched, and no request follows a redirect (#14755). | |
| 180 | Enforced by: `test/webspec.test.ts` | |
| 181 | - A connected origin's replies are validated at the boundary and not trusted for | |
| 182 | identity. | |
| 183 | Enforced by: `test/origins-security-provider.test.ts` | |
| 184 | - A push to an origin is vetted like a fetch from one: a name that resolves | |
| 185 | to a private, loopback, link-local, tailnet or metadata address is refused | |
| 186 | before git starts, in the fetch's words; git dials the address that was | |
| 187 | judged and follows no redirect. A hosted forge's proposal to its parent | |
| 188 | trusts the parent's host by name for that one push. | |
| 189 | Enforced by: `test/mirror-outbound-push.test.ts` | |
| 190 | - A migration from a connected origin clones only from that origin's own host, | |
| 191 | whatever `clone_url` its reply names, and that address is vetted and pinned | |
| 192 | like a pasted one: a private, loopback, link-local or metadata answer is | |
| 193 | refused before git starts (#14756). | |
| 194 | Enforced by: `test/migrate.test.ts` | |
| 195 | - Pushes from an origin cannot rewrite what the forge protects. | |
| 196 | Enforced by: `test/origins-security-push.test.ts` | |
| 197 | - Backups are encrypted before they leave the machine. | |
| 198 | Enforced by: `test/snapshot-store.test.ts` | |
| 199 | - A review of lockfile changes (`bun.lock`) before they reach an app's cell. | |
| 200 | Enforced by: none yet | |
| 201 | ||
| 202 | ## A hostile agent inside a run | |
| 203 | ||
| 204 | Wants: to read what it was not given, reach what it may not, or land code no | |
| 205 | person approved. | |
| 206 | ||
| 207 | - The agent's shell may reach only the forge, the package registry and its | |
| 208 | own repository's app (production and each open pull's preview), by exact | |
| 209 | host, and never another repository's app. The | |
| 210 | forge's repositories, index, key and every other agent's clone are denied by | |
| 211 | name and by allow-list, and a listing that fails refuses the run. | |
| 212 | Enforced by: `test/crew-sandbox.test.ts` | |
| 213 | - No name a tenant chose is allowed whole, since the tenant can point its | |
| 214 | DNS at loopback, a private network or the metadata address. An app is | |
| 215 | reached at the slug host the forge serves, never at its verified custom | |
| 216 | domain. A member's model gateway must be a public dotted name (no IP | |
| 217 | literal, `localhost`, single label or private suffix), and the run's shell | |
| 218 | is never allowed the gateway's name. A row saved before the rule is never | |
| 219 | picked and never dialled (#14750). | |
| 220 | Enforced by: `test/crew-sandbox-tenant-hosts.test.ts` | |
| 221 | - A member's gateway name can still be repointed after it is saved, so | |
| 222 | nothing dials it unjudged: Claude Code, for a run and for the usage check, | |
| 223 | is pointed at the forge's loopback door (`crew/gateway_door.ts`), which | |
| 224 | sends each request through `outboundFetch` — resolved, every address | |
| 225 | judged, dialled at the judged address — and the run's shell is allowed only | |
| 226 | that door's port (#14750). | |
| 227 | Enforced by: `test/crew-gateway-door.test.ts` | |
| 228 | - The one place a run writes beside its clone and temp directory is its | |
| 229 | repository's bun install cache (`crew/.cache/<repo id>/bun`), which every | |
| 230 | run on that repository can write: a run can poison what the next run on the | |
| 231 | same repository installs. It is per repository: the cache root is denied whole | |
| 232 | and only this repository's directory re-allowed, so a cache made later is | |
| 233 | denied too, and deleting the repository removes it. | |
| 234 | Enforced by: `test/crew-install-cache.test.ts` | |
| 235 | - The crew's dependency install runs on the host, in a clone the repository | |
| 236 | and earlier runs filled: a lockfile, `package.json`, `node_modules` or | |
| 237 | `node_modules/.forge-lock-hash` that is a link (to `forge.db`, | |
| 238 | `secret.key`, `/dev/zero`, another repository's directory) is refused or | |
| 239 | replaced, never read or written through (#14751). A link that names | |
| 240 | nothing counts as present and is refused, never read as absent. The | |
| 241 | lockfile and mark are read on the open file (`O_NOFOLLOW`, then `fstat`), | |
| 242 | so nothing can be swapped in between a check and a read. One window | |
| 243 | remains, and it is stated here: `node_modules` is checked with `lstat` | |
| 244 | before `bun install` runs and again just before the mark is written, but | |
| 245 | `bun install` itself and the mark's rename go by name. Swapping a path in | |
| 246 | that window needs something running in the clone at the same time, and | |
| 247 | nothing in this run is: the install runs in the run's setup, before its | |
| 248 | agent session starts (`src/crew/runner.ts`), and `--ignore-scripts` runs | |
| 249 | no code from the repository. Two runs sharing one clone at once would | |
| 250 | reopen the window; that is not what this item covers. | |
| 251 | Enforced by: `test/install-links.test.ts` | |
| 252 | - A check's cache fill reads the pull's `bun.lock` and `package.json` on the | |
| 253 | host only as regular files of at most 64 MB, opened without following a | |
| 254 | link and never waiting on a pipe or device: a committed link to a host | |
| 255 | file leaks none of it into the check log, and one to `/dev/zero` cannot | |
| 256 | hold the forge (#14751). | |
| 257 | Enforced by: `test/install-links.test.ts` | |
| 258 | - A check's cell reads its repository's shared bun cache | |
| 259 | (`check-install/<repo id>/bun`) through a read-only bind and cannot write | |
| 260 | it, so one pull cannot plant a package the gate on main installs. The | |
| 261 | forge fills it on the host with `--ignore-scripts`, and reads no | |
| 262 | `bunfig.toml` or `.npmrc` of the pull's. | |
| 263 | Enforced by: `test/check-install.test.ts` | |
| 264 | - An app environment's cell reads that same cache read-only and | |
| 265 | copies from it, so a preview cannot plant a package production installs; | |
| 266 | the forge fills it through the same lockfile rule as a check's. | |
| 267 | Enforced by: `test/app-install-cache.test.ts` | |
| 268 | - The forge fills that cache only from a lockfile whose every package is a | |
| 269 | registry `name@version` with a sha512 integrity (`checks/fillable.ts`): | |
| 270 | the host never fetches a URL a pull chose and reads no file, link or | |
| 271 | workspace a pull points at, an override's or resolution's included. | |
| 272 | Enforced by: `test/check-fillable.test.ts` | |
| 273 | - A locked tarball URL is "" or exactly the registry's tarball of that | |
| 274 | entry's `name@version`, so a pull cannot lock another package's tarball | |
| 275 | (even one on the registry, with its own integrity) under a name and | |
| 276 | version and plant it in the shared cache, where bun does not re-check it | |
| 277 | on a hit (#14761): the test "a tarball url of another package on the | |
| 278 | registry cannot be locked under this name@version". | |
| 279 | Enforced by: `test/check-fillable.test.ts` | |
| 280 | - The same policy holds against a real bubblewrap, not only as a string. | |
| 281 | Enforced by: `test/crew-sandbox-real.test.ts` | |
| 282 | - The OpenAI-compatible runner's Bash is held to the same policy: every | |
| 283 | denied path is covered in its bubblewrap (the key, the index, the | |
| 284 | repositories, every other agent's directory), only the clone, its temp | |
| 285 | directory and its install cache are writable, and its network namespace's | |
| 286 | one way out is the forge's egress proxy, which passes the policy's hosts | |
| 287 | alone and refuses loopback, private addresses and the metadata service. | |
| 288 | Enforced by: `test/openai-runner-escape.test.ts` | |
| 289 | - That runner's file tools refuse a path through a link to nothing (one the | |
| 290 | shell planted, or a checkout made), and write with `O_NOFOLLOW`, so Write | |
| 291 | cannot create a file outside the clone with the forge's own rights. | |
| 292 | Enforced by: `test/openai-runner-escape.test.ts` | |
| 293 | - That runner takes its endpoint, key and model from the forge's own | |
| 294 | environment, never the run's: a granted secret cannot name the URL the | |
| 295 | operator's key is sent to, a secret cannot be named `OPENAI_*`, and the | |
| 296 | endpoint's redirects are refused. | |
| 297 | Enforced by: `test/openai-runner-escape.test.ts` | |
| 298 | - Git the forge runs on the host in a crew clone (the wrap-up's status, add, | |
| 299 | commit and push, a kept clone's fetch, reset and checkout, the leak scan) | |
| 300 | runs nothing the agent planted there: every call goes through | |
| 301 | `crew/clone_git.ts`, which refuses a `.git` that is a link, a gitfile or | |
| 302 | borrows another repository, names `--git-dir` and `--work-tree` (so | |
| 303 | `core.worktree` points nowhere), and pins hooks, `core.fsmonitor`, every | |
| 304 | filter and diff driver the clone's config names, ssh and every transport | |
| 305 | but http(s) off on the command line, above the clone's own config. The | |
| 306 | forge's commit passes `--no-verify` (#14747). | |
| 307 | Enforced by: `test/crew-clone-git.test.ts` | |
| 308 | - The stale-clone sweep's git in an idle clone (`crew/orphans.ts`) runs the | |
| 309 | same way, with the git environment and not the forge's, so a planted | |
| 310 | `core.fsmonitor` neither runs nor sees a forge secret (#14747). | |
| 311 | Enforced by: `test/crew-clone-git.test.ts` | |
| 312 | - Under the OpenAI-compatible runner the clone's `.git/config` and | |
| 313 | `.git/hooks` are bound read-only in the shell's bubblewrap, as in the | |
| 314 | Claude runner's sandbox, and its Write and Edit tools refuse any path in | |
| 315 | `.git`, by name or through a link (#14747). | |
| 316 | Enforced by: `test/crew-clone-git.test.ts` | |
| 317 | - A pull's check and its preview reach the hosts, and run at the limits, that | |
| 318 | its base branch's `forge.json` declares, never the ones its own asks for, | |
| 319 | until the pull lands: code on a branch, the crew's as much as a guest's, | |
| 320 | cannot widen where its own check and preview send what they hold. The | |
| 321 | pull's page and the top of its logs say in one line what it asked for and | |
| 322 | that it applies when the pull lands. | |
| 323 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-pull-egress.test.ts` | |
| 324 | - An agent cannot push to the default branch or merge; a person merges. | |
| 325 | Enforced by: `test/protection.test.ts` | |
| 326 | - An outside agent that drives a person's account cannot push past the pulls | |
| 327 | either: a protected default takes a push from its admins only, so every | |
| 328 | other writer lands through a pull, its gate and its review. | |
| 329 | Enforced by: `test/protected-default-push.test.ts` | |
| 330 | - A variable set with no scope named is production's alone: a pull's preview, | |
| 331 | which runs code nobody has landed, reads a variable only when its owner | |
| 332 | chose "Also in previews" or set one for previews. | |
| 333 | Enforced by: `test/app-env.test.ts` | |
| 334 | - Merge gates (checks, review) are enforced in the merge path, not by convention. | |
| 335 | Enforced by: `test/security-merge.test.ts` | |
| 336 | - Spend, time and turns per run are limited. | |
| 337 | Enforced by: `test/crew-limits.test.ts` | |
| 338 | - Rendered output escapes everything an agent wrote. | |
| 339 | Enforced by: `test/security-xss.test.ts` | |
| 340 | ||
| 341 | ## An automated attacker at scale | |
| 342 | ||
| 343 | Wants: accounts, spam, resources, or a way to exhaust the forge. | |
| 344 | ||
| 345 | - Request bodies are capped at the boundary. | |
| 346 | Enforced by: `test/body-limits.test.ts` | |
| 347 | - Parsers survive generated hostile input. | |
| 348 | Enforced by: `test/fuzz-parsers.test.ts` | |
| 349 | - Anonymous spawn is rate limited per client address. | |
| 350 | Enforced by: `test/spawn-anon.test.ts` | |
| 351 | - Every door a stranger can reach that costs (API reads, clones, code | |
| 352 | search on the page, the API and the terminal's guest palette, event | |
| 353 | streams, spawn plans) is limited per address and for every stranger | |
| 354 | together (`src/http/strangers.ts`, docs/ARCHITECTURE.md, concurrency | |
| 355 | invariant 7); a signed-in push keeps its share of the pool. | |
| 356 | Enforced by: `test/strangers.test.ts` | |
| 357 | - The client address is the socket's peer unless that peer is a configured | |
| 358 | trusted proxy; `X-Forwarded-For` is read from the right, past trusted hops. | |
| 359 | Enforced by: `test/client-address.test.ts` | |
| 360 | - A new-account guard can refuse repository creation and forks for young | |
| 361 | accounts. | |
| 362 | Enforced by: `test/guard-new-accounts.test.ts` | |
| 363 | - Sign-up has a ceiling per address and for the whole forge, per minute and per | |
| 364 | hour, and an admin can close it at once. | |
| 365 | Enforced by: `test/guest-contribute.test.ts` | |
| 366 | - A guest owns only a contribution fork of a public repository. It holds no | |
| 367 | settings, secrets or app, nothing runs for it, and its storage, forks and | |
| 368 | pulls are limited (`docs/ROLES.md`). | |
| 369 | Enforced by: `test/guest-contribute.test.ts` | |
| 370 | - An outside agent with a contribute token (no account) pushes its branch into | |
| 371 | the repository itself, so where a head lives says nothing about who wrote it: | |
| 372 | a `contrib/<agent>/<segment>/…` head is a guest's. Its check runs with | |
| 373 | nobody's permission, behind the owner's and the crew's work, in a cell that | |
| 374 | holds no variable, token or secret and is held to the hosts and limits the | |
| 375 | base branch declares; nothing from its branch is previewed, and the crew | |
| 376 | leaves it, until a writer approves the pull once. On a machine with no | |
| 377 | cell its check does not run unapproved either, and says the press that | |
| 378 | lifts it. | |
| 379 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tokens-crew.test.ts` | |
| 380 | - An outside agent gets one harmless head of its pull approved by the crew's | |
| 381 | reviewer (or steers the reviewer by prompt injection), then pushes a new | |
| 382 | head whose preview would hold the app's settings. A reviewer's approval | |
| 383 | holds for the head it read only; the new head waits again for a person or | |
| 384 | a new review. A person's approval is for the pull, as before. | |
| 385 | Enforced by: `test/outside-lane.test.ts` | |
| 386 | - A fork shares its parent's git objects, and git answers for any object a | |
| 387 | store holds to whoever names it by id. So someone who reads a fork and may | |
| 388 | not read its parent (the parent was made private after the fork; they left | |
| 389 | its organisation or its crew) is held to what the fork's own refs reach: at | |
| 390 | the git door over protocol v2 and v0, for a commit, a tree or a file, and at | |
| 391 | the fork's pages, API, tools and terminal by a full id or a short one, | |
| 392 | answered exactly as an id nothing holds. A `shallow <id>` line is held like a | |
| 393 | want, for a held reader and a runner's job token alike, when the fetch | |
| 394 | deepens without a bound: `deepen 0`, `deepen 2147483647` (what | |
| 395 | `--unshallow` sends), any `deepen` git would not read as a plain depth, and | |
| 396 | `deepen-relative` at any depth. Git would unshallow such an id from the | |
| 397 | shared store and send its parents. Every `shallow` id is held too while | |
| 398 | the first flush has not arrived, so a request cut off before it is held | |
| 399 | as one that deepens without a bound. A finite `deepen`, `deepen-since` and | |
| 400 | `deepen-not` walk only from the wants, which are held, so their `shallow` | |
| 401 | lines are not: git sends no `unshallow` for them and no object of them, | |
| 402 | and a runner's kept shallow clone still fetches. Still open (#14850): a | |
| 403 | `have` the lender holds is ACKed and a `shallow` naming a lender's tree | |
| 404 | makes git die, so someone with a full id can learn it exists, though not | |
| 405 | what it holds. A parent that is not public no | |
| 406 | longer moves a public fork, and a push into such a fork must carry every new | |
| 407 | object it names. Everyone else fetches as before, partial clones included. | |
| 408 | What a fork's own refs already held stays the fork's: the read-only | |
| 409 | `forks-beyond-parent` script lists the forks to look at. | |
| 410 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-fork-objects.test.ts` | |
| 411 | - A pull whose head lives in a fork, here or on the origin, and a child's | |
| 412 | proposal run nothing until a person who can write the repository approves | |
| 413 | that exact head, and the crew never lands one. | |
| 414 | Enforced by: `test/guest-contribute.test.ts` | |
| 415 | - A branch in the repository itself was put there by someone who may write it | |
| 416 | (on a mirror, by someone its origin lets write), so its check and preview | |
| 417 | run at once. When its author is a guest from the origin, its preview and | |
| 418 | that preview's terminal still hold none of the app's variables, no forge | |
| 419 | token and no copy of production's data until a writer approves the pull. | |
| 420 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-secrets-process.test.ts` | |
| 421 | - Every limit is a setting with its reason, changed by an admin only. | |
| 422 | Enforced by: `test/limits.test.ts` | |
| 423 | - Distributed attacks across many addresses: only the whole-forge caps stand | |
| 424 | here. | |
| 425 | Enforced by: none yet | |
| 426 | ||
| 427 | ## Internal calls | |
| 428 | ||
| 429 | `FORGE_SELF_SWAP=1` binds the web port with SO_REUSEPORT so a release can share | |
| 430 | it, which also lets any process running as the forge's user join the listener | |
| 431 | and take a share of its connections, login posts included. It assumes nothing | |
| 432 | else runs as that user on the host network (agents and apps are sandboxed or in | |
| 433 | cells). Only one swap is made per process, so two landings never leave two | |
| 434 | releases serving. The swap is refused unless `net.ipv4.tcp_migrate_req=1`, for | |
| 435 | without it the old listener closing resets queued connections. | |
| 436 | Enforced by: `test/release-swap.test.ts` | |
| 437 | ||
| 438 | How each part proves itself to the next, today. | |
| 439 | ||
| 440 | | Call | Authenticated by | Enforced by | | |
| 441 | | --- | --- | --- | | |
| 442 | | runner → forge | the run's scoped token (`FORGE_TOKEN`) and a few-minute passport (`FORGE_PASSPORT`) | `test/passport-edge.test.ts` | | |
| 443 | | git hook → forge | per-boot secret in `x-forge-hook-secret` on the internal listener; a call without it is refused and counted | `test/crew-sandbox.test.ts` | | |
| 444 | | cell → proxy | the proxy's Unix socket bound into the cell's own network namespace; no credential, the namespace is the identity | `test/contain.test.ts` | | |
| 445 | | host → cell | the relay carrying a visitor to an app dials the cell's `in.sock` by the inode it opened with `O_PATH \| O_NOFOLLOW` and checked (a socket, the cell's uid, one name), through `/proc/self/fd/N`, so a symlink or hard link the cell plants there reaches no host socket, and the refusal is a line in the owner's log; the uid check holds because a cell runs as the forge's own uid (`--unshare-user` with no `--uid`/`--gid`, `cellNamespaces`) (#14752) | `test/cell-socket-pin.test.ts` | | |
| 446 | | edge → pod | `X-Plat-Edge-Token` equal to `FORGE_EDGE_TOKEN`, compared as fixed-width digests; without it `X-Plat-User` is ignored; the `signin.edge` setting (admin, refused for an admin with no password or passkey) turns the edge's identity off on every door | `test/edge-auth.test.ts` | | |
| 447 | | child → parent | a heartbeat and a brokered sign-in are signed (HMAC) with the key spawn gave both sides, looked up by the name inside the signed body, so the door a call arrives on says nothing about whose it is; the lent model by a bearer whose hash the parent keeps; a child's door answers those routes and nothing else. Code is pulled over public git, and the claim link (sha256 kept, 24 hours, single use) hands the child to its person | `test/boundary-tenancy-cell.test.ts` | | |
| 448 | ||
| 449 | Gaps: edge → pod and runner → forge ride a shared secret, not a per-call | |
| 450 | signature. | |
| 451 | ||
| 452 | ## A child forge running its own code (#11144) | |
| 453 | ||
| 454 | A cell child's owner may switch it from the parent's code to its own `<org>/forge` main (`spawn/own_code.ts`). The code is then the child's author's, so treat it as hostile code in a cell, the same as any app. | |
| 455 | ||
| 456 | What it cannot reach: the cell's memory, CPU, disk and I/O limits, its sandbox and its egress list are the same as with the parent's code, and nothing in the child's repository is read to make them. The parent's data, home and temporary directory are hidden; only the parent's code and the one checkout (a tree, with no `.git`) are revealed, read-only. Its `forge.json` is not run by the parent: the parent finds the repository only as a directory of the child's own (never through a link), refuses a repository or tree over 256 MB or 50,000 files and any symbolic link in either, checks that `src/main.ts` parses and `forge.json` is JSON, and never executes the child's code outside the cell. What the parent records about a failed start is fixed wording: one of a list of the parent's own sentences. Nothing the child wrote or printed reaches the ledger, the rollback row or the `forge.rolled_back` event; its last lines go to the parent's log. | |
| 457 | ||
| 458 | What it can reach: everything a child forge can reach, no more: its own data directory, the parent's heartbeat door and public address, the hosts the admin allowed for models, registry, payment and origins (the public git hosts and the forges its parent holds beside it), and the sign-ins its parent brokers for it. It can lie in what it serves and in its heartbeat, and can break itself: a start that fails to answer within the deadline rolls back to the last commit that came up, then to the parent's code, and the owner's `/forges` page shows a Rolled back row saying so. A commit that failed is not tried again until main moves. A child that comes up and breaks later is not rolled back; the owner switches it off. Hosted children run inside the parent's process and cannot turn this on. | |
| 459 | ||
| 460 | - The cell limits, sandbox, egress list and hidden parent paths are built by the | |
| 461 | parent from outside, never read from the child's repository, so a child's own | |
| 462 | code is held exactly like any app. | |
| 463 | Enforced by: `test/own-code.test.ts` | |
| 464 | - A forge made in a cell stays a cell child. A cell that does not start | |
| 465 | leaves it stopped, its address and its host's forges page saying why and | |
| 466 | when the host tries again; it is not opened in the parent's process for | |
| 467 | that, since its directory (its repositories' hooks and git config included) | |
| 468 | is the child's to write. Only a host that holds no cell at all runs a child | |
| 469 | in its own process, and never one that has run code of its own. | |
| 470 | Enforced by: `test/spawn-cell-stays.test.ts` | |
| 471 | - A forge that still runs inside its parent's process (made before cells, or | |
| 472 | put there by an older release) is moved into a cell of its own, by an | |
| 473 | admin's button or by the forge's own pass at boot and when one sleeps; a | |
| 474 | move that does not prove itself is put back (the sizes it is given are held | |
| 475 | by `test/spawn-move-cell-sizes.test.ts`). | |
| 476 | Enforced by: `test/spawn-move-cell.test.ts` | |
| 477 | - Before such a forge leaves its parent's process its repositories are read, | |
| 478 | running nothing, for what that process may have executed while it had no | |
| 479 | wall: hooks beyond the forge's own stubs and config keys that make git run | |
| 480 | a command, reported by name and never by content. | |
| 481 | Enforced by: `test/spawn-move-scan.test.ts` | |
| 482 | - A host that holds every forge in a cell seals: it opens no forge in its | |
| 483 | own process again whatever a ledger says, never moves a cell child into | |
| 484 | its process because its own probe of cells failed, and places a new forge | |
| 485 | in a cell or not at all. | |
| 486 | Enforced by: `test/spawn-sealed-host.test.ts` | |
| 487 | - The parent asks a child's database (is this session the child's, is its | |
| 488 | crew at work, its public apps) off its serving thread, with a deadline, and | |
| 489 | only of plain tables: a view of the same name is never run, and a statement | |
| 490 | that does not end costs that child one answer of "unknown" and nobody else | |
| 491 | anything. | |
| 492 | Enforced by: `test/child-db-off-thread.test.ts` | |
| 493 | - What the parent writes and reads in a child's directory from outside its | |
| 494 | cell (the stop note, the plan notice, the credit, the app links, the starts | |
| 495 | ledger, the key file) follows no link the child left there: one writer that | |
| 496 | makes its own file and moves it into place, one reader that takes a regular | |
| 497 | file or nothing and never waits on a pipe. A link under the key's name is a | |
| 498 | refusal, never read through and never minted over. | |
| 499 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tenancy-files.test.ts` | |
| 500 | - A child's own code is found and copied only from a repository in its own | |
| 501 | directory with no link in it, and what is recorded when its start fails is a | |
| 502 | sentence from the parent's list, whatever was handed in. | |
| 503 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tenancy-files.test.ts` | |
| 504 | - Side by side, one child's cell has namespaces of its own for users, | |
| 505 | processes, network, IPC and hostname; its way out reaches its own door on | |
| 506 | the parent by that exact port and refuses a neighbour's door, a neighbour's | |
| 507 | port and the parent's own port on loopback; and a heartbeat or a model | |
| 508 | bearer made with one child's key opens nothing of another's. | |
| 509 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tenancy-cell.test.ts` | |
| 510 | - A child is held to its size by the kernel where the forge has a delegated | |
| 511 | cgroup: memory (no swap, the whole cell killed together), cores, processes | |
| 512 | and disk bandwidth, at a tenth of the forge's own weight. Where it has | |
| 513 | none, the hold changes hands and is said: a pin and pausing for cores, the | |
| 514 | watch for memory and processes. | |
| 515 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tenancy-limits.test.ts` | |
| 516 | - The forge keeps memory for itself that the cells together cannot take: a | |
| 517 | floor on its own cgroup where that is delegated (`memory.min` and | |
| 518 | `memory.low`, a limit an admin sets), and every cell's and crew run's first | |
| 519 | process raises its own `oom_score_adj` above the forge's, so short of memory | |
| 520 | the kernel chooses a cell first. No hosted forge is refused a start for | |
| 521 | memory: when the sizes together pass the machine, /forges and the forge's | |
| 522 | needs say so in one line. Proven as the files written and the argv a cell | |
| 523 | starts as, not as the kernel's behaviour; a cell that sets out to can lower | |
| 524 | its figure back to the forge's own, never below it. | |
| 525 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tenancy-limits.test.ts` | |
| 526 | - Beyond its parent, a hosted forge's cell reaches only what the parent's | |
| 527 | settings name, each on 443: the model, registry and payment hosts, the | |
| 528 | public git hosts, and the forges its parent holds beside it (one name ending | |
| 529 | in `--<parent's host>`). No other name under the parent's domain opens, and | |
| 530 | the list never holds a wildcard on a domain: under a shared suffix that | |
| 531 | would be everyone's host there. | |
| 532 | Enforced by: `test/spawn-cell.test.ts` | |
| 533 | - A name on a cell's list is still held to every address it resolves to: one | |
| 534 | private, loopback, link-local, tailnet or metadata answer among public ones | |
| 535 | refuses it, in every spelling, whichever entry named it. A name that is not | |
| 536 | on the list is refused before it is looked up, and nothing is dialled. | |
| 537 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-outbound.test.ts` | |
| 538 | - A name an admin allows a hosted forge beyond that list is one public host | |
| 539 | name on 443, for that forge alone or for every one: never an address, a | |
| 540 | wildcard, another port or a name that is private by its shape, whether the | |
| 541 | forge asked for it or the admin typed it, and a name that resolves inside a | |
| 542 | network is not taken as an ask. A granted name is still judged by every | |
| 543 | address it resolves to. Only a person who is a site admin answers, from the | |
| 544 | parent's own pages; a form sent from another site changes nothing. What the | |
| 545 | hosted forge says about who asked and why is cleaned and only ever shown. | |
| 546 | Enforced by: `test/ask-to-reach.test.ts` | |
| 547 | - A sign-in the parent brokers for a hosted forge hands the token over once, | |
| 548 | inside a minute, to the forge that began it and to no other, and what the | |
| 549 | parent keeps is an event naming the forge, the host and the account: never | |
| 550 | a token or a code. Before the provider is asked anything, the parent shows | |
| 551 | the person one page that names the hosted forge, from the parent's own | |
| 552 | ledger, and the provider, with one way on: the provider's own consent names | |
| 553 | the parent's application and may ask nothing. | |
| 554 | Enforced by: `test/origin-broker.test.ts` | |
| 555 | - A token a brokered sign-in sealed is deleted after its minute across a | |
| 556 | restart too: the broker's rows are swept as the forge boots. | |
| 557 | Enforced by: `test/origin-broker-boot.test.ts` | |
| 558 | ||
| 559 | - The repository a child's proposal credential is bound to is the parent's to say: the | |
| 560 | template repository its own ledger names, else its own code, as it forked the child. A | |
| 561 | child that writes another repository into its `parent.json` is refused and the refusal | |
| 562 | logged; no token is minted for the repository it named (#14759). | |
| 563 | Enforced by: `test/proposal-handout.test.ts` | |
| 564 | ||
| 565 | ## Honeypots (later) | |
| 566 | ||
| 567 | A `kind: "honeypot"` app, a decoy that records what touches it, is not built. | |
| 568 | `forge.json` accepts `web` and `service` only. Before one may exist: | |
| 569 | ||
| 570 | - the cell must hold (above), since the point is to run hostile traffic next to | |
| 571 | real apps; | |
| 572 | - its egress must be none, not declared hosts; | |
| 573 | - it must carry no secret, no token and no data from any real app; | |
| 574 | - what it records must be bounded and escaped like any other input. | |
| 575 | ||
| 576 | Until then, nothing here claims one. | |
| 21 | - [](threats/snooper.md) | |
| 22 | - [](threats/stolen-token.md) | |
| 23 | - [](threats/compromised-vendor.md) | |
| 24 | - [](threats/hostile-agent.md) | |
| 25 | - [](threats/automated-attacker.md) | |
| 26 | - [](threats/internal-calls.md) | |
| 27 | - [](threats/child-forge.md) | |
| 28 | - [](threats/honeypots.md) |
docs/threats/automated-attacker.md added +85
| @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ | ||
| 1 | ## An automated attacker at scale | |
| 2 | ||
| 3 | Wants: accounts, spam, resources, or a way to exhaust the forge. | |
| 4 | ||
| 5 | - Request bodies are capped at the boundary. | |
| 6 | Enforced by: `test/body-limits.test.ts` | |
| 7 | - Parsers survive generated hostile input. | |
| 8 | Enforced by: `test/fuzz-parsers.test.ts` | |
| 9 | - Anonymous spawn is rate limited per client address. | |
| 10 | Enforced by: `test/spawn-anon.test.ts` | |
| 11 | - Every door a stranger can reach that costs (API reads, clones, code | |
| 12 | search on the page, the API and the terminal's guest palette, event | |
| 13 | streams, spawn plans) is limited per address and for every stranger | |
| 14 | together (`src/http/strangers.ts`, docs/ARCHITECTURE.md, concurrency | |
| 15 | invariant 7); a signed-in push keeps its share of the pool. | |
| 16 | Enforced by: `test/strangers.test.ts` | |
| 17 | - The client address is the socket's peer unless that peer is a configured | |
| 18 | trusted proxy; `X-Forwarded-For` is read from the right, past trusted hops. | |
| 19 | Enforced by: `test/client-address.test.ts` | |
| 20 | - A new-account guard can refuse repository creation and forks for young | |
| 21 | accounts. | |
| 22 | Enforced by: `test/guard-new-accounts.test.ts` | |
| 23 | - Sign-up has a ceiling per address and for the whole forge, per minute and per | |
| 24 | hour, and an admin can close it at once. | |
| 25 | Enforced by: `test/guest-contribute.test.ts` | |
| 26 | - A guest owns only a contribution fork of a public repository. It holds no | |
| 27 | settings, secrets or app, nothing runs for it, and its storage, forks and | |
| 28 | pulls are limited (`docs/ROLES.md`). | |
| 29 | Enforced by: `test/guest-contribute.test.ts` | |
| 30 | - An outside agent with a contribute token (no account) pushes its branch into | |
| 31 | the repository itself, so where a head lives says nothing about who wrote it: | |
| 32 | a `contrib/<agent>/<segment>/…` head is a guest's. Its check runs with | |
| 33 | nobody's permission, behind the owner's and the crew's work, in a cell that | |
| 34 | holds no variable, token or secret and is held to the hosts and limits the | |
| 35 | base branch declares; nothing from its branch is previewed, and the crew | |
| 36 | leaves it, until a writer approves the pull once. On a machine with no | |
| 37 | cell its check does not run unapproved either, and says the press that | |
| 38 | lifts it. | |
| 39 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tokens-crew.test.ts` | |
| 40 | - An outside agent gets one harmless head of its pull approved by the crew's | |
| 41 | reviewer (or steers the reviewer by prompt injection), then pushes a new | |
| 42 | head whose preview would hold the app's settings. A reviewer's approval | |
| 43 | holds for the head it read only; the new head waits again for a person or | |
| 44 | a new review. A person's approval is for the pull, as before. | |
| 45 | Enforced by: `test/outside-lane.test.ts` | |
| 46 | - A fork shares its parent's git objects, and git answers for any object a | |
| 47 | store holds to whoever names it by id. So someone who reads a fork and may | |
| 48 | not read its parent (the parent was made private after the fork; they left | |
| 49 | its organisation or its crew) is held to what the fork's own refs reach: at | |
| 50 | the git door over protocol v2 and v0, for a commit, a tree or a file, and at | |
| 51 | the fork's pages, API, tools and terminal by a full id or a short one, | |
| 52 | answered exactly as an id nothing holds. A `shallow <id>` line is held like a | |
| 53 | want, for a held reader and a runner's job token alike, when the fetch | |
| 54 | deepens without a bound: `deepen 0`, `deepen 2147483647` (what | |
| 55 | `--unshallow` sends), any `deepen` git would not read as a plain depth, and | |
| 56 | `deepen-relative` at any depth. Git would unshallow such an id from the | |
| 57 | shared store and send its parents. Every `shallow` id is held too while | |
| 58 | the first flush has not arrived, so a request cut off before it is held | |
| 59 | as one that deepens without a bound. A finite `deepen`, `deepen-since` and | |
| 60 | `deepen-not` walk only from the wants, which are held, so their `shallow` | |
| 61 | lines are not: git sends no `unshallow` for them and no object of them, | |
| 62 | and a runner's kept shallow clone still fetches. Still open (#14850): a | |
| 63 | `have` the lender holds is ACKed and a `shallow` naming a lender's tree | |
| 64 | makes git die, so someone with a full id can learn it exists, though not | |
| 65 | what it holds. A parent that is not public no | |
| 66 | longer moves a public fork, and a push into such a fork must carry every new | |
| 67 | object it names. Everyone else fetches as before, partial clones included. | |
| 68 | What a fork's own refs already held stays the fork's: the read-only | |
| 69 | `forks-beyond-parent` script lists the forks to look at. | |
| 70 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-fork-objects.test.ts` | |
| 71 | - A pull whose head lives in a fork, here or on the origin, and a child's | |
| 72 | proposal run nothing until a person who can write the repository approves | |
| 73 | that exact head, and the crew never lands one. | |
| 74 | Enforced by: `test/guest-contribute.test.ts` | |
| 75 | - A branch in the repository itself was put there by someone who may write it | |
| 76 | (on a mirror, by someone its origin lets write), so its check and preview | |
| 77 | run at once. When its author is a guest from the origin, its preview and | |
| 78 | that preview's terminal still hold none of the app's variables, no forge | |
| 79 | token and no copy of production's data until a writer approves the pull. | |
| 80 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-secrets-process.test.ts` | |
| 81 | - Every limit is a setting with its reason, changed by an admin only. | |
| 82 | Enforced by: `test/limits.test.ts` | |
| 83 | - Distributed attacks across many addresses: only the whole-forge caps stand | |
| 84 | here. | |
| 85 | Enforced by: none yet |
docs/threats/child-forge.md added +112
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| 1 | ## A child forge running its own code (#11144) | |
| 2 | ||
| 3 | A cell child's owner may switch it from the parent's code to its own `<org>/forge` main (`spawn/own_code.ts`). The code is then the child's author's, so treat it as hostile code in a cell, the same as any app. | |
| 4 | ||
| 5 | What it cannot reach: the cell's memory, CPU, disk and I/O limits, its sandbox and its egress list are the same as with the parent's code, and nothing in the child's repository is read to make them. The parent's data, home and temporary directory are hidden; only the parent's code and the one checkout (a tree, with no `.git`) are revealed, read-only. Its `forge.json` is not run by the parent: the parent finds the repository only as a directory of the child's own (never through a link), refuses a repository or tree over 256 MB or 50,000 files and any symbolic link in either, checks that `src/main.ts` parses and `forge.json` is JSON, and never executes the child's code outside the cell. What the parent records about a failed start is fixed wording: one of a list of the parent's own sentences. Nothing the child wrote or printed reaches the ledger, the rollback row or the `forge.rolled_back` event; its last lines go to the parent's log. | |
| 6 | ||
| 7 | What it can reach: everything a child forge can reach, no more: its own data directory, the parent's heartbeat door and public address, the hosts the admin allowed for models, registry, payment and origins (the public git hosts and the forges its parent holds beside it), and the sign-ins its parent brokers for it. It can lie in what it serves and in its heartbeat, and can break itself: a start that fails to answer within the deadline rolls back to the last commit that came up, then to the parent's code, and the owner's `/forges` page shows a Rolled back row saying so. A commit that failed is not tried again until main moves. A child that comes up and breaks later is not rolled back; the owner switches it off. Hosted children run inside the parent's process and cannot turn this on. | |
| 8 | ||
| 9 | - The cell limits, sandbox, egress list and hidden parent paths are built by the | |
| 10 | parent from outside, never read from the child's repository, so a child's own | |
| 11 | code is held exactly like any app. | |
| 12 | Enforced by: `test/own-code.test.ts` | |
| 13 | - A forge made in a cell stays a cell child. A cell that does not start | |
| 14 | leaves it stopped, its address and its host's forges page saying why and | |
| 15 | when the host tries again; it is not opened in the parent's process for | |
| 16 | that, since its directory (its repositories' hooks and git config included) | |
| 17 | is the child's to write. Only a host that holds no cell at all runs a child | |
| 18 | in its own process, and never one that has run code of its own. | |
| 19 | Enforced by: `test/spawn-cell-stays.test.ts` | |
| 20 | - A forge that still runs inside its parent's process (made before cells, or | |
| 21 | put there by an older release) is moved into a cell of its own, by an | |
| 22 | admin's button or by the forge's own pass at boot and when one sleeps; a | |
| 23 | move that does not prove itself is put back (the sizes it is given are held | |
| 24 | by `test/spawn-move-cell-sizes.test.ts`). | |
| 25 | Enforced by: `test/spawn-move-cell.test.ts` | |
| 26 | - Before such a forge leaves its parent's process its repositories are read, | |
| 27 | running nothing, for what that process may have executed while it had no | |
| 28 | wall: hooks beyond the forge's own stubs and config keys that make git run | |
| 29 | a command, reported by name and never by content. | |
| 30 | Enforced by: `test/spawn-move-scan.test.ts` | |
| 31 | - A host that holds every forge in a cell seals: it opens no forge in its | |
| 32 | own process again whatever a ledger says, never moves a cell child into | |
| 33 | its process because its own probe of cells failed, and places a new forge | |
| 34 | in a cell or not at all. | |
| 35 | Enforced by: `test/spawn-sealed-host.test.ts` | |
| 36 | - The parent asks a child's database (is this session the child's, is its | |
| 37 | crew at work, its public apps) off its serving thread, with a deadline, and | |
| 38 | only of plain tables: a view of the same name is never run, and a statement | |
| 39 | that does not end costs that child one answer of "unknown" and nobody else | |
| 40 | anything. | |
| 41 | Enforced by: `test/child-db-off-thread.test.ts` | |
| 42 | - What the parent writes and reads in a child's directory from outside its | |
| 43 | cell (the stop note, the plan notice, the credit, the app links, the starts | |
| 44 | ledger, the key file) follows no link the child left there: one writer that | |
| 45 | makes its own file and moves it into place, one reader that takes a regular | |
| 46 | file or nothing and never waits on a pipe. A link under the key's name is a | |
| 47 | refusal, never read through and never minted over. | |
| 48 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tenancy-files.test.ts` | |
| 49 | - A child's own code is found and copied only from a repository in its own | |
| 50 | directory with no link in it, and what is recorded when its start fails is a | |
| 51 | sentence from the parent's list, whatever was handed in. | |
| 52 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tenancy-files.test.ts` | |
| 53 | - Side by side, one child's cell has namespaces of its own for users, | |
| 54 | processes, network, IPC and hostname; its way out reaches its own door on | |
| 55 | the parent by that exact port and refuses a neighbour's door, a neighbour's | |
| 56 | port and the parent's own port on loopback; and a heartbeat or a model | |
| 57 | bearer made with one child's key opens nothing of another's. | |
| 58 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tenancy-cell.test.ts` | |
| 59 | - A child is held to its size by the kernel where the forge has a delegated | |
| 60 | cgroup: memory (no swap, the whole cell killed together), cores, processes | |
| 61 | and disk bandwidth, at a tenth of the forge's own weight. Where it has | |
| 62 | none, the hold changes hands and is said: a pin and pausing for cores, the | |
| 63 | watch for memory and processes. | |
| 64 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tenancy-limits.test.ts` | |
| 65 | - The forge keeps memory for itself that the cells together cannot take: a | |
| 66 | floor on its own cgroup where that is delegated (`memory.min` and | |
| 67 | `memory.low`, a limit an admin sets), and every cell's and crew run's first | |
| 68 | process raises its own `oom_score_adj` above the forge's, so short of memory | |
| 69 | the kernel chooses a cell first. No hosted forge is refused a start for | |
| 70 | memory: when the sizes together pass the machine, /forges and the forge's | |
| 71 | needs say so in one line. Proven as the files written and the argv a cell | |
| 72 | starts as, not as the kernel's behaviour; a cell that sets out to can lower | |
| 73 | its figure back to the forge's own, never below it. | |
| 74 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tenancy-limits.test.ts` | |
| 75 | - Beyond its parent, a hosted forge's cell reaches only what the parent's | |
| 76 | settings name, each on 443: the model, registry and payment hosts, the | |
| 77 | public git hosts, and the forges its parent holds beside it (one name ending | |
| 78 | in `--<parent's host>`). No other name under the parent's domain opens, and | |
| 79 | the list never holds a wildcard on a domain: under a shared suffix that | |
| 80 | would be everyone's host there. | |
| 81 | Enforced by: `test/spawn-cell.test.ts` | |
| 82 | - A name on a cell's list is still held to every address it resolves to: one | |
| 83 | private, loopback, link-local, tailnet or metadata answer among public ones | |
| 84 | refuses it, in every spelling, whichever entry named it. A name that is not | |
| 85 | on the list is refused before it is looked up, and nothing is dialled. | |
| 86 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-outbound.test.ts` | |
| 87 | - A name an admin allows a hosted forge beyond that list is one public host | |
| 88 | name on 443, for that forge alone or for every one: never an address, a | |
| 89 | wildcard, another port or a name that is private by its shape, whether the | |
| 90 | forge asked for it or the admin typed it, and a name that resolves inside a | |
| 91 | network is not taken as an ask. A granted name is still judged by every | |
| 92 | address it resolves to. Only a person who is a site admin answers, from the | |
| 93 | parent's own pages; a form sent from another site changes nothing. What the | |
| 94 | hosted forge says about who asked and why is cleaned and only ever shown. | |
| 95 | Enforced by: `test/ask-to-reach.test.ts` | |
| 96 | - A sign-in the parent brokers for a hosted forge hands the token over once, | |
| 97 | inside a minute, to the forge that began it and to no other, and what the | |
| 98 | parent keeps is an event naming the forge, the host and the account: never | |
| 99 | a token or a code. Before the provider is asked anything, the parent shows | |
| 100 | the person one page that names the hosted forge, from the parent's own | |
| 101 | ledger, and the provider, with one way on: the provider's own consent names | |
| 102 | the parent's application and may ask nothing. | |
| 103 | Enforced by: `test/origin-broker.test.ts` | |
| 104 | - A token a brokered sign-in sealed is deleted after its minute across a | |
| 105 | restart too: the broker's rows are swept as the forge boots. | |
| 106 | Enforced by: `test/origin-broker-boot.test.ts` | |
| 107 | ||
| 108 | - The repository a child's proposal credential is bound to is the parent's to say: the | |
| 109 | template repository its own ledger names, else its own code, as it forked the child. A | |
| 110 | child that writes another repository into its `parent.json` is refused and the refusal | |
| 111 | logged; no token is minted for the repository it named (#14759). | |
| 112 | Enforced by: `test/proposal-handout.test.ts` |
docs/threats/compromised-vendor.md added +79
| @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ | ||
| 1 | ## A compromised vendor | |
| 2 | ||
| 3 | Wants: to run its code on the forge or in an app through something the forge | |
| 4 | trusts: a package, a model provider, a hosting provider, an origin it syncs from. | |
| 5 | ||
| 6 | - The forge has no runtime dependencies, so there is no package to poison in the | |
| 7 | forge itself. | |
| 8 | Enforced by: `test/deps.test.ts` | |
| 9 | - An app's code runs in a cell: read-only machine, empty data directory and | |
| 10 | home, own pid and network namespaces, memory, CPU and disk watched. A | |
| 11 | dependency an app pulls in gets no more than the app does. | |
| 12 | Enforced by: `test/contain.test.ts` | |
| 13 | - A cell binds each directory it may write once, nothing inside one by name, | |
| 14 | and only a directory that is there itself: a link its code leaves where its | |
| 15 | home goes is never mounted. What it hides (the forge's data, home and temp) | |
| 16 | is covered under the name it really has as well as the one it was given, | |
| 17 | before its own directory is bound back, and no neighbour's directory is | |
| 18 | ever shown. | |
| 19 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tenancy-cell.test.ts` | |
| 20 | - What a cell prints costs the forge one line at most, however long it goes | |
| 21 | without a newline: an app's or a step's line is cut at 64 KiB as it arrives | |
| 22 | and says so, a hosted forge's at 500 characters. That text is held in the | |
| 23 | forge's own memory, outside the cell's cap. | |
| 24 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tenancy-limits.test.ts` | |
| 25 | - A cell's disk is counted to the end or the cell is over it: the walk goes as | |
| 26 | far as the cell's own limit of files (as many as its disk has 4 KiB blocks, | |
| 27 | a million at least), and a cell that reaches it is stopped and told so, | |
| 28 | never counted as the part that was seen. | |
| 29 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tenancy-limits.test.ts` | |
| 30 | - Outside Kubernetes a cell sees the machine's mounts minus the ones that may | |
| 31 | carry a secret (every tmpfs, everything under `/run`): a second mount of the | |
| 32 | data volume, an env file or a backup volume bound in at another path is | |
| 33 | readable in every cell. `FORGE_CELL_MOUNTS=allow-list` closes it; it is not | |
| 34 | yet the default wherever the forge runs in a container. | |
| 35 | Enforced by: none yet | |
| 36 | - A preview's copy of production's data is taken while production runs and | |
| 37 | can swap any entry for a link to a host path (`secret.key`, `forge.db`, | |
| 38 | another tenant's data): the forge walks it through held directory | |
| 39 | descriptors with `O_NOFOLLOW`, copies a link as a link and never what it | |
| 40 | points at, and checkpoints SQLite only in the copy it alone writes, where | |
| 41 | `quick_check` refuses a database torn by a write mid-copy (copied again, | |
| 42 | five times at most, then the seed fails); a log is copied before its | |
| 43 | database and its shared-memory index never. An app's backup seals such a | |
| 44 | snapshot, never the live directory. | |
| 45 | Enforced by: `test/apps-data-symlink-race.test.ts` | |
| 46 | - An app that prints the variables, identity key or forge token it was handed | |
| 47 | leaves `[redacted]` in its deploy's log, plain or encoded, so a careless | |
| 48 | dependency does not publish them to everyone who can read the runs. | |
| 49 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-secrets-process.test.ts` | |
| 50 | - The only way out of a cell is the egress proxy, which reaches the hosts the | |
| 51 | repository declared and refuses names that resolve to private, loopback or | |
| 52 | metadata addresses. | |
| 53 | Enforced by: `test/apps-adversarial.test.ts` | |
| 54 | - The website-spec check the forge runs from its own process against a live | |
| 55 | preview fetches only the preview's own origin: an icon, manifest or | |
| 56 | stylesheet the app's HTML names on another host (metadata, a private or | |
| 57 | tailnet address, another app's loopback port) is reported as off-origin and | |
| 58 | never fetched, and no request follows a redirect (#14755). | |
| 59 | Enforced by: `test/webspec.test.ts` | |
| 60 | - A connected origin's replies are validated at the boundary and not trusted for | |
| 61 | identity. | |
| 62 | Enforced by: `test/origins-security-provider.test.ts` | |
| 63 | - A push to an origin is vetted like a fetch from one: a name that resolves | |
| 64 | to a private, loopback, link-local, tailnet or metadata address is refused | |
| 65 | before git starts, in the fetch's words; git dials the address that was | |
| 66 | judged and follows no redirect. A hosted forge's proposal to its parent | |
| 67 | trusts the parent's host by name for that one push. | |
| 68 | Enforced by: `test/mirror-outbound-push.test.ts` | |
| 69 | - A migration from a connected origin clones only from that origin's own host, | |
| 70 | whatever `clone_url` its reply names, and that address is vetted and pinned | |
| 71 | like a pasted one: a private, loopback, link-local or metadata answer is | |
| 72 | refused before git starts (#14756). | |
| 73 | Enforced by: `test/migrate.test.ts` | |
| 74 | - Pushes from an origin cannot rewrite what the forge protects. | |
| 75 | Enforced by: `test/origins-security-push.test.ts` | |
| 76 | - Backups are encrypted before they leave the machine. | |
| 77 | Enforced by: `test/snapshot-store.test.ts` | |
| 78 | - A review of lockfile changes (`bun.lock`) before they reach an app's cell. | |
| 79 | Enforced by: none yet |
docs/threats/honeypots.md added +12
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| 1 | ## Honeypots (later) | |
| 2 | ||
| 3 | A `kind: "honeypot"` app, a decoy that records what touches it, is not built. | |
| 4 | `forge.json` accepts `web` and `service` only. Before one may exist: | |
| 5 | ||
| 6 | - the cell must hold (above), since the point is to run hostile traffic next to | |
| 7 | real apps; | |
| 8 | - its egress must be none, not declared hosts; | |
| 9 | - it must carry no secret, no token and no data from any real app; | |
| 10 | - what it records must be bounded and escaped like any other input. | |
| 11 | ||
| 12 | Until then, nothing here claims one. |
docs/threats/hostile-agent.md added +138
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| 1 | ## A hostile agent inside a run | |
| 2 | ||
| 3 | Wants: to read what it was not given, reach what it may not, or land code no | |
| 4 | person approved. | |
| 5 | ||
| 6 | - The agent's shell may reach only the forge, the package registry and its | |
| 7 | own repository's app (production and each open pull's preview), by exact | |
| 8 | host, and never another repository's app. The | |
| 9 | forge's repositories, index, key and every other agent's clone are denied by | |
| 10 | name and by allow-list, and a listing that fails refuses the run. | |
| 11 | Enforced by: `test/crew-sandbox.test.ts` | |
| 12 | - No name a tenant chose is allowed whole, since the tenant can point its | |
| 13 | DNS at loopback, a private network or the metadata address. An app is | |
| 14 | reached at the slug host the forge serves, never at its verified custom | |
| 15 | domain. A member's model gateway must be a public dotted name (no IP | |
| 16 | literal, `localhost`, single label or private suffix), and the run's shell | |
| 17 | is never allowed the gateway's name. A row saved before the rule is never | |
| 18 | picked and never dialled (#14750). | |
| 19 | Enforced by: `test/crew-sandbox-tenant-hosts.test.ts` | |
| 20 | - A member's gateway name can still be repointed after it is saved, so | |
| 21 | nothing dials it unjudged: Claude Code, for a run and for the usage check, | |
| 22 | is pointed at the forge's loopback door (`crew/gateway_door.ts`), which | |
| 23 | sends each request through `outboundFetch` — resolved, every address | |
| 24 | judged, dialled at the judged address — and the run's shell is allowed only | |
| 25 | that door's port (#14750). | |
| 26 | Enforced by: `test/crew-gateway-door.test.ts` | |
| 27 | - The one place a run writes beside its clone and temp directory is its | |
| 28 | repository's bun install cache (`crew/.cache/<repo id>/bun`), which every | |
| 29 | run on that repository can write: a run can poison what the next run on the | |
| 30 | same repository installs. It is per repository: the cache root is denied whole | |
| 31 | and only this repository's directory re-allowed, so a cache made later is | |
| 32 | denied too, and deleting the repository removes it. | |
| 33 | Enforced by: `test/crew-install-cache.test.ts` | |
| 34 | - The crew's dependency install runs on the host, in a clone the repository | |
| 35 | and earlier runs filled: a lockfile, `package.json`, `node_modules` or | |
| 36 | `node_modules/.forge-lock-hash` that is a link (to `forge.db`, | |
| 37 | `secret.key`, `/dev/zero`, another repository's directory) is refused or | |
| 38 | replaced, never read or written through (#14751). A link that names | |
| 39 | nothing counts as present and is refused, never read as absent. The | |
| 40 | lockfile and mark are read on the open file (`O_NOFOLLOW`, then `fstat`), | |
| 41 | so nothing can be swapped in between a check and a read. One window | |
| 42 | remains, and it is stated here: `node_modules` is checked with `lstat` | |
| 43 | before `bun install` runs and again just before the mark is written, but | |
| 44 | `bun install` itself and the mark's rename go by name. Swapping a path in | |
| 45 | that window needs something running in the clone at the same time, and | |
| 46 | nothing in this run is: the install runs in the run's setup, before its | |
| 47 | agent session starts (`src/crew/runner.ts`), and `--ignore-scripts` runs | |
| 48 | no code from the repository. Two runs sharing one clone at once would | |
| 49 | reopen the window; that is not what this item covers. | |
| 50 | Enforced by: `test/install-links.test.ts` | |
| 51 | - A check's cache fill reads the pull's `bun.lock` and `package.json` on the | |
| 52 | host only as regular files of at most 64 MB, opened without following a | |
| 53 | link and never waiting on a pipe or device: a committed link to a host | |
| 54 | file leaks none of it into the check log, and one to `/dev/zero` cannot | |
| 55 | hold the forge (#14751). | |
| 56 | Enforced by: `test/install-links.test.ts` | |
| 57 | - A check's cell reads its repository's shared bun cache | |
| 58 | (`check-install/<repo id>/bun`) through a read-only bind and cannot write | |
| 59 | it, so one pull cannot plant a package the gate on main installs. The | |
| 60 | forge fills it on the host with `--ignore-scripts`, and reads no | |
| 61 | `bunfig.toml` or `.npmrc` of the pull's. | |
| 62 | Enforced by: `test/check-install.test.ts` | |
| 63 | - An app environment's cell reads that same cache read-only and | |
| 64 | copies from it, so a preview cannot plant a package production installs; | |
| 65 | the forge fills it through the same lockfile rule as a check's. | |
| 66 | Enforced by: `test/app-install-cache.test.ts` | |
| 67 | - The forge fills that cache only from a lockfile whose every package is a | |
| 68 | registry `name@version` with a sha512 integrity (`checks/fillable.ts`): | |
| 69 | the host never fetches a URL a pull chose and reads no file, link or | |
| 70 | workspace a pull points at, an override's or resolution's included. | |
| 71 | Enforced by: `test/check-fillable.test.ts` | |
| 72 | - A locked tarball URL is "" or exactly the registry's tarball of that | |
| 73 | entry's `name@version`, so a pull cannot lock another package's tarball | |
| 74 | (even one on the registry, with its own integrity) under a name and | |
| 75 | version and plant it in the shared cache, where bun does not re-check it | |
| 76 | on a hit (#14761): the test "a tarball url of another package on the | |
| 77 | registry cannot be locked under this name@version". | |
| 78 | Enforced by: `test/check-fillable.test.ts` | |
| 79 | - The same policy holds against a real bubblewrap, not only as a string. | |
| 80 | Enforced by: `test/crew-sandbox-real.test.ts` | |
| 81 | - The OpenAI-compatible runner's Bash is held to the same policy: every | |
| 82 | denied path is covered in its bubblewrap (the key, the index, the | |
| 83 | repositories, every other agent's directory), only the clone, its temp | |
| 84 | directory and its install cache are writable, and its network namespace's | |
| 85 | one way out is the forge's egress proxy, which passes the policy's hosts | |
| 86 | alone and refuses loopback, private addresses and the metadata service. | |
| 87 | Enforced by: `test/openai-runner-escape.test.ts` | |
| 88 | - That runner's file tools refuse a path through a link to nothing (one the | |
| 89 | shell planted, or a checkout made), and write with `O_NOFOLLOW`, so Write | |
| 90 | cannot create a file outside the clone with the forge's own rights. | |
| 91 | Enforced by: `test/openai-runner-escape.test.ts` | |
| 92 | - That runner takes its endpoint, key and model from the forge's own | |
| 93 | environment, never the run's: a granted secret cannot name the URL the | |
| 94 | operator's key is sent to, a secret cannot be named `OPENAI_*`, and the | |
| 95 | endpoint's redirects are refused. | |
| 96 | Enforced by: `test/openai-runner-escape.test.ts` | |
| 97 | - Git the forge runs on the host in a crew clone (the wrap-up's status, add, | |
| 98 | commit and push, a kept clone's fetch, reset and checkout, the leak scan) | |
| 99 | runs nothing the agent planted there: every call goes through | |
| 100 | `crew/clone_git.ts`, which refuses a `.git` that is a link, a gitfile or | |
| 101 | borrows another repository, names `--git-dir` and `--work-tree` (so | |
| 102 | `core.worktree` points nowhere), and pins hooks, `core.fsmonitor`, every | |
| 103 | filter and diff driver the clone's config names, ssh and every transport | |
| 104 | but http(s) off on the command line, above the clone's own config. The | |
| 105 | forge's commit passes `--no-verify` (#14747). | |
| 106 | Enforced by: `test/crew-clone-git.test.ts` | |
| 107 | - The stale-clone sweep's git in an idle clone (`crew/orphans.ts`) runs the | |
| 108 | same way, with the git environment and not the forge's, so a planted | |
| 109 | `core.fsmonitor` neither runs nor sees a forge secret (#14747). | |
| 110 | Enforced by: `test/crew-clone-git.test.ts` | |
| 111 | - Under the OpenAI-compatible runner the clone's `.git/config` and | |
| 112 | `.git/hooks` are bound read-only in the shell's bubblewrap, as in the | |
| 113 | Claude runner's sandbox, and its Write and Edit tools refuse any path in | |
| 114 | `.git`, by name or through a link (#14747). | |
| 115 | Enforced by: `test/crew-clone-git.test.ts` | |
| 116 | - A pull's check and its preview reach the hosts, and run at the limits, that | |
| 117 | its base branch's `forge.json` declares, never the ones its own asks for, | |
| 118 | until the pull lands: code on a branch, the crew's as much as a guest's, | |
| 119 | cannot widen where its own check and preview send what they hold. The | |
| 120 | pull's page and the top of its logs say in one line what it asked for and | |
| 121 | that it applies when the pull lands. | |
| 122 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-pull-egress.test.ts` | |
| 123 | - An agent cannot push to the default branch or merge; a person merges. | |
| 124 | Enforced by: `test/protection.test.ts` | |
| 125 | - An outside agent that drives a person's account cannot push past the pulls | |
| 126 | either: a protected default takes a push from its admins only, so every | |
| 127 | other writer lands through a pull, its gate and its review. | |
| 128 | Enforced by: `test/protected-default-push.test.ts` | |
| 129 | - A variable set with no scope named is production's alone: a pull's preview, | |
| 130 | which runs code nobody has landed, reads a variable only when its owner | |
| 131 | chose "Also in previews" or set one for previews. | |
| 132 | Enforced by: `test/app-env.test.ts` | |
| 133 | - Merge gates (checks, review) are enforced in the merge path, not by convention. | |
| 134 | Enforced by: `test/security-merge.test.ts` | |
| 135 | - Spend, time and turns per run are limited. | |
| 136 | Enforced by: `test/crew-limits.test.ts` | |
| 137 | - Rendered output escapes everything an agent wrote. | |
| 138 | Enforced by: `test/security-xss.test.ts` |
docs/threats/internal-calls.md added +24
| @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ | ||
| 1 | ## Internal calls | |
| 2 | ||
| 3 | `FORGE_SELF_SWAP=1` binds the web port with SO_REUSEPORT so a release can share | |
| 4 | it, which also lets any process running as the forge's user join the listener | |
| 5 | and take a share of its connections, login posts included. It assumes nothing | |
| 6 | else runs as that user on the host network (agents and apps are sandboxed or in | |
| 7 | cells). Only one swap is made per process, so two landings never leave two | |
| 8 | releases serving. The swap is refused unless `net.ipv4.tcp_migrate_req=1`, for | |
| 9 | without it the old listener closing resets queued connections. | |
| 10 | Enforced by: `test/release-swap.test.ts` | |
| 11 | ||
| 12 | How each part proves itself to the next, today. | |
| 13 | ||
| 14 | | Call | Authenticated by | Enforced by | | |
| 15 | | --- | --- | --- | | |
| 16 | | runner → forge | the run's scoped token (`FORGE_TOKEN`) and a few-minute passport (`FORGE_PASSPORT`) | `test/passport-edge.test.ts` | | |
| 17 | | git hook → forge | per-boot secret in `x-forge-hook-secret` on the internal listener; a call without it is refused and counted | `test/crew-sandbox.test.ts` | | |
| 18 | | cell → proxy | the proxy's Unix socket bound into the cell's own network namespace; no credential, the namespace is the identity | `test/contain.test.ts` | | |
| 19 | | host → cell | the relay carrying a visitor to an app dials the cell's `in.sock` by the inode it opened with `O_PATH \| O_NOFOLLOW` and checked (a socket, the cell's uid, one name), through `/proc/self/fd/N`, so a symlink or hard link the cell plants there reaches no host socket, and the refusal is a line in the owner's log; the uid check holds because a cell runs as the forge's own uid (`--unshare-user` with no `--uid`/`--gid`, `cellNamespaces`) (#14752) | `test/cell-socket-pin.test.ts` | | |
| 20 | | edge → pod | `X-Plat-Edge-Token` equal to `FORGE_EDGE_TOKEN`, compared as fixed-width digests; without it `X-Plat-User` is ignored; the `signin.edge` setting (admin, refused for an admin with no password or passkey) turns the edge's identity off on every door | `test/edge-auth.test.ts` | | |
| 21 | | child → parent | a heartbeat and a brokered sign-in are signed (HMAC) with the key spawn gave both sides, looked up by the name inside the signed body, so the door a call arrives on says nothing about whose it is; the lent model by a bearer whose hash the parent keeps; a child's door answers those routes and nothing else. Code is pulled over public git, and the claim link (sha256 kept, 24 hours, single use) hands the child to its person | `test/boundary-tenancy-cell.test.ts` | | |
| 22 | ||
| 23 | Gaps: edge → pod and runner → forge ride a shared secret, not a per-call | |
| 24 | signature. |
docs/threats/snooper.md added +17
| @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ | ||
| 1 | ## A snooper on the network | |
| 2 | ||
| 3 | Wants: session cookies, tokens and pushed code in transit, or to learn who | |
| 4 | talks to whom. | |
| 5 | ||
| 6 | - Sessions are HttpOnly cookies, `Secure` when the request came over https, so | |
| 7 | script cannot read one and a plain-http hop does not carry it. | |
| 8 | Enforced by: `test/own-session.test.ts` | |
| 9 | - Tokens are shown once; the database keeps only their sha256, so a copy of the | |
| 10 | index does not replay as a login. | |
| 11 | Enforced by: `test/tokens.test.ts` | |
| 12 | - TLS is terminated by the edge in front of the forge, and certificates are | |
| 13 | issued only for names the forge vouches for (`on_demand_tls` ask). | |
| 14 | Enforced by: none yet | |
| 15 | - Between the edge and the forge process, and between forge and cell, traffic is | |
| 16 | plain HTTP on one machine or a pod network. Nothing encrypts it. | |
| 17 | Enforced by: none yet |
docs/threats/stolen-token.md added +87
| @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ | ||
| 1 | ## A stolen token | |
| 2 | ||
| 3 | Wants: to act as the person or agent it was issued to, for as long as it works. | |
| 4 | ||
| 5 | - Tokens carry a scope and an optional expiry; a narrower token cannot do what a | |
| 6 | wider one can. | |
| 7 | Enforced by: `test/tokens.test.ts` | |
| 8 | - A crew run's secrets are named in the brief, opened per run, redacted from the | |
| 9 | log, and released when the run ends. | |
| 10 | Enforced by: `test/run-secrets.test.ts` | |
| 11 | - The model credential in a crew run's environment is held for redaction like a | |
| 12 | granted secret, from before the agent starts until the run ends: a run that | |
| 13 | says it leaves `[redacted]` in its log, its summary and every event. The | |
| 14 | two other children the forge starts with that credential, a one-shot and a | |
| 15 | conversation turn, are held the same way. | |
| 16 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-secrets-run.test.ts` | |
| 17 | - A passport (`fp1.…`) is bound to one audience and scope set and dies in | |
| 18 | minutes, so a copy lifted from a run is useful to one door briefly. | |
| 19 | Enforced by: `test/passport.test.ts` | |
| 20 | - Sign-in attempts are throttled per client, with a whole-forge cap beside it; eight wrong passwords at one account from one client in ten minutes shut that pair until the window passes (`src/core/signin-window.ts`, #14373). | |
| 21 | Enforced by: `test/signin-throttle.test.ts` | |
| 22 | - Stored provider tokens (origins) are sealed under a key in `secret.key`, never | |
| 23 | returned by any route. | |
| 24 | Enforced by: `test/origins-security-auth.test.ts` | |
| 25 | - The operator's GitHub application (`FORGE_GITHUB_CLIENT_ID`, `_SECRET`) is | |
| 26 | github.com's alone: a host a member calls GitHub Enterprise gets no app, and | |
| 27 | the secret is withheld from every other host at the device poll, the | |
| 28 | refresh and the revoke, whatever registration carries it (#14757). | |
| 29 | Enforced by: `test/origins-github-secret.test.ts` | |
| 30 | - The SSH host key and the database files are created 0600; a host key group- | |
| 31 | or world-readable is refused, and a database file found too open is a | |
| 32 | degraded finding naming the chmod, never a silent change and never a stop. | |
| 33 | Enforced by: `test/file-modes.test.ts` | |
| 34 | - The files a forge's family keeps keys in (`parent.json`: the heartbeat key, a | |
| 35 | proposal token, a read credential offered and not yet sealed; the parent's | |
| 36 | `spawn/<name>.json`: the status token and the heartbeat key) are written 0600 | |
| 37 | (`writePrivate`), and one found wider is narrowed at boot and said once. | |
| 38 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tokens-follow.test.ts` | |
| 39 | - A token bound to one repository (a run's, a child's, an outside agent's, an | |
| 40 | app's) is refused on every route of every other repository before the | |
| 41 | route's handler runs, and ends with its repository: it never becomes an | |
| 42 | unbound one. | |
| 43 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tokens-gates.test.ts` | |
| 44 | - Every such token is minted with an end, read on every use, and its own | |
| 45 | revoke ends it at the next request, with no restart and no wait. A | |
| 46 | repository's admin sees and ends every child's read of it, whoever it was | |
| 47 | minted as; a suspended account's tokens stop with it. | |
| 48 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tokens-gates.test.ts` | |
| 49 | - A crew run's git offers its token to this forge's two addresses and to no | |
| 50 | other host it talks to, and the token ends with the run. | |
| 51 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tokens-crew.test.ts` | |
| 52 | - The credential a child holds to read a private app is minted for that one | |
| 53 | repository and kept by the parent as a hash; the child seals it with its own | |
| 54 | key and keeps it in no file, config or address. It lives a week at a time, | |
| 55 | renewed while the child follows, and ends when the child is removed, refuses | |
| 56 | the offer or is revoked; no log line or event on either forge carries it. | |
| 57 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tokens-follow.test.ts` | |
| 58 | - A child's tokens and an outside agent's contribute token never enter an app | |
| 59 | at its own host, whoever's account they ride on. The token a preview's own | |
| 60 | process holds reaches its repository, its timers and its printer, and | |
| 61 | nothing else of its owner's. | |
| 62 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-tokens-apphost.test.ts` | |
| 63 | - Only a forge admin sets or removes a secret, and nothing is opened for | |
| 64 | anyone else. An open leaves one `secret.read` per name opened; no event | |
| 65 | carries a value, plain or sealed; the data browser shows no sealed column. | |
| 66 | The key file is 32 bytes only its owner reads, and one that others can read | |
| 67 | is refused by name. A lost key costs the values and nothing else. Deleting a | |
| 68 | repository removes the secrets scoped to it. | |
| 69 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-secrets-store.test.ts` | |
| 70 | - A secret kept for the forge or an organization reaches a repository's app | |
| 71 | and its crew's runs only after a forge admin granted that name to that | |
| 72 | repository; a repository's own secrets need no grant. A name a run declares | |
| 73 | and nobody granted is never opened: the run goes on without it and says so | |
| 74 | in its log and once on its issue, with the link that grants it. | |
| 75 | Enforced by: `test/boundary-secrets-store.test.ts` | |
| 76 | - A production app's `FORGE_TOKEN` is its owner's read-only token: the app's | |
| 77 | code and what it depends on read everything its owner reads, every private | |
| 78 | repository included. A preview's is bound to the app's one repository; | |
| 79 | production's is not, because reading the whole forge from an app is a | |
| 80 | documented feature (`docs/APPS.md`, `examples/forge-live`). Binding it too | |
| 81 | waits for the owner's word: it needs a per-app grant the owner sees listed, | |
| 82 | and until that grant is given it stops an app that reads its owner's other | |
| 83 | repositories on purpose. | |
| 84 | Enforced by: none yet | |
| 85 | - Revoking every token of one account at once, and telling its owner a token was | |
| 86 | used from somewhere new. | |
| 87 | Enforced by: none yet |
src/checks/resilience.ts +2 −6
| @@ -3,18 +3,14 @@ | ||
| 3 | 3 | * each line of docs/THREATS.md with its standing in the last full gate. |
| 4 | 4 | */ |
| 5 | 5 | |
| 6 | import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; | |
| 7 | import { join } from "node:path"; | |
| 8 | import { parseThreats, standing, type Protection, type Standing } from "../core/threats.ts"; | |
| 6 | import { parseThreats, readThreats, standing, type Protection, type Standing } from "../core/threats.ts"; | |
| 9 | 7 | import { readGate } from "./gate_last.ts"; |
| 10 | 8 | |
| 11 | const DOC = join(import.meta.dir, "..", "..", "docs", "THREATS.md"); | |
| 12 | ||
| 13 | 9 | export type Row = { p: Protection; s: Standing }; |
| 14 | 10 | |
| 15 | 11 | function doc(): string { |
| 16 | 12 | try { |
| 17 | return readFileSync(DOC, "utf8"); | |
| 13 | return readThreats(); | |
| 18 | 14 | } catch { |
| 19 | 15 | return ""; |
| 20 | 16 | } |
src/core/threats.ts +50 −1
| @@ -1,9 +1,58 @@ | ||
| 1 | 1 | /** |
| 2 | 2 | * The protections in docs/THREATS.md, as plain data: each `Enforced by:` line |
| 3 | 3 | * (after a bullet or a paragraph) and each table row naming a call, with the |
| 4 | * enforcer cited, or none. | |
| 4 | * enforcer cited, or none. docs/THREATS.md is an index: its preamble, then one | |
| 5 | * link per section, each section a file in docs/threats/ (#15005), so two | |
| 6 | * pulls about two adversaries touch two files. `readThreats` puts them back | |
| 7 | * together as one document, in the index's order; everything else reads that. | |
| 5 | 8 | */ |
| 6 | 9 | |
| 10 | import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; | |
| 11 | import { join } from "node:path"; | |
| 12 | ||
| 13 | const DOCS = join(import.meta.dir, "..", "..", "docs"); | |
| 14 | ||
| 15 | /** One section's line in the index: `- [its heading](threats/its-file.md)`. */ | |
| 16 | export const SECTION_LINK = /^- \[(.+)\]\(threats\/([a-z0-9-]+\.md)\)$/; | |
| 17 | ||
| 18 | export interface SectionLink { | |
| 19 | readonly heading: string; | |
| 20 | readonly file: string; | |
| 21 | } | |
| 22 | ||
| 23 | /** The sections the index links, in its order. */ | |
| 24 | export function sectionLinks(index: string): SectionLink[] { | |
| 25 | const out: SectionLink[] = []; | |
| 26 | for (const line of index.split("\n")) { | |
| 27 | const m = SECTION_LINK.exec(line); | |
| 28 | if (m !== null) out.push({ heading: m[1]!, file: m[2]! }); | |
| 29 | } | |
| 30 | return out; | |
| 31 | } | |
| 32 | ||
| 33 | /** | |
| 34 | * The whole document: the index up to its first section link, then each | |
| 35 | * linked file in order, a blank line between. `read` gets a bare file name. | |
| 36 | */ | |
| 37 | export function assembleThreats(index: string, read: (file: string) => string): string { | |
| 38 | const first = index.split("\n").findIndex((l) => SECTION_LINK.test(l)); | |
| 39 | if (first < 0) return index; | |
| 40 | const preamble = index.split("\n").slice(0, first).join("\n") + "\n"; | |
| 41 | return preamble + sectionLinks(index).map((s) => read(s.file).trimEnd() + "\n").join("\n"); | |
| 42 | } | |
| 43 | ||
| 44 | /** docs/THREATS.md with its sections read back in; a file that cannot be read adds nothing. */ | |
| 45 | export function readThreats(docs = DOCS): string { | |
| 46 | const index = readFileSync(join(docs, "THREATS.md"), "utf8"); | |
| 47 | return assembleThreats(index, (file) => { | |
| 48 | try { | |
| 49 | return readFileSync(join(docs, "threats", file), "utf8"); | |
| 50 | } catch { | |
| 51 | return ""; | |
| 52 | } | |
| 53 | }); | |
| 54 | } | |
| 55 | ||
| 7 | 56 | export interface Protection { |
| 8 | 57 | readonly adversary: string; |
| 9 | 58 | readonly text: string; |
src/view/docs.ts +4 −1
| @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ | ||
| 10 | 10 | import { parseSection, renderSpine } from "./design_spine.ts"; |
| 11 | 11 | import { parseFront, renderFeatureIndex, stripFront } from "./feature_index.ts"; |
| 12 | 12 | import { docsPages, renderDocsIndex } from "./docs_index.ts"; |
| 13 | import { readThreats } from "../core/threats.ts"; | |
| 13 | 14 | import { readdirSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; |
| 14 | 15 | import { join } from "node:path"; |
| 15 | 16 | |
| @@ -52,9 +53,11 @@ export function docText(entry: DocEntry, ssh = false): string { | ||
| 52 | 53 | |
| 53 | 54 | /** |
| 54 | 55 | * A document as read: a note without its front matter, the features index built from the notes |
| 55 | * (#14248), the design file's list of sections from the section files (#14354). | |
| 56 | * (#14248), the design file's list of sections from the section files (#14354), the threats | |
| 57 | * index with its section files read back in (#15005). | |
| 56 | 58 | */ |
| 57 | 59 | function readDoc(name: string): string { |
| 60 | if (name === "THREATS.md") return stripFront(readThreats(DOCS)); | |
| 58 | 61 | const text = readFileSync(join(DOCS, name), "utf8"); |
| 59 | 62 | if (name === "DESIGN.md") { |
| 60 | 63 | const dir = join(DOCS, "design", "sections"); |
test/checks-resilience.test.ts +2 −2
| @@ -5,14 +5,14 @@ | ||
| 5 | 5 | * never dropped. |
| 6 | 6 | */ |
| 7 | 7 | import { afterAll, beforeAll, expect, test } from "bun:test"; |
| 8 | import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; | |
| 9 | 8 | import { mkdtemp, rm } from "node:fs/promises"; |
| 10 | 9 | import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; |
| 11 | 10 | import { join } from "node:path"; |
| 12 | 11 | import { keepGate } from "../src/checks/gate_last.ts"; |
| 13 | 12 | import { readResilience, type Row } from "../src/checks/resilience.ts"; |
| 13 | import { readThreats } from "../src/core/threats.ts"; | |
| 14 | 14 | |
| 15 | const DOC = readFileSync(join(import.meta.dir, "..", "docs", "THREATS.md"), "utf8"); | |
| 15 | const DOC = readThreats(); | |
| 16 | 16 | const UNKNOWN = new Set(["untested", "no test yet"]); |
| 17 | 17 | |
| 18 | 18 | // Counted from the document without its parser: one protection per `Enforced by:` |
test/resilience.test.ts +2 −2
| @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; | ||
| 9 | 9 | import { join } from "node:path"; |
| 10 | 10 | import { createApp, type App } from "../src/app.ts"; |
| 11 | 11 | import { fileResults, keepForgeGate, keepGate, readGate } from "../src/checks/gate_last.ts"; |
| 12 | import { parseThreats, standing } from "../src/core/threats.ts"; | |
| 12 | import { parseThreats, readThreats, standing } from "../src/core/threats.ts"; | |
| 13 | 13 | import { createUser, getUserByName } from "../src/core/users.ts"; |
| 14 | 14 | import type { Ctx, Screen } from "../src/tui/app/app.ts"; |
| 15 | 15 | import { forgeCommands, Session } from "../src/tui/forge.ts"; |
| @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ describe("resilience", () => { | ||
| 64 | 64 | }); |
| 65 | 65 | |
| 66 | 66 | test("the real docs/THREATS.md yields one protection per Enforced by: line and per → row", async () => { |
| 67 | const md = await Bun.file(join(import.meta.dir, "..", "docs", "THREATS.md")).text(); | |
| 67 | const md = readThreats(); | |
| 68 | 68 | const tests = md.split("\n").filter((l) => /^\s*Enforced by: /.test(l)).length; |
| 69 | 69 | const rows = md.split("\n").filter((l) => l.startsWith("| ") && l.includes("→")).length; |
| 70 | 70 | const got = parseThreats(md); |
test/threats-enforced.test.ts +3 −3
| @@ -5,12 +5,12 @@ | ||
| 5 | 5 | * and only editing a row lowers it. |
| 6 | 6 | */ |
| 7 | 7 | import { expect, test } from "bun:test"; |
| 8 | import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; | |
| 8 | import { existsSync } from "node:fs"; | |
| 9 | 9 | import { join } from "node:path"; |
| 10 | import { enforcement, parseThreats } from "../src/core/threats.ts"; | |
| 10 | import { enforcement, parseThreats, readThreats } from "../src/core/threats.ts"; | |
| 11 | 11 | |
| 12 | 12 | const root = join(import.meta.dir, ".."); |
| 13 | const doc = readFileSync(join(root, "docs/THREATS.md"), "utf8"); | |
| 13 | const doc = readThreats(); | |
| 14 | 14 | const exists = (path: string): boolean => existsSync(join(root, path)); |
| 15 | 15 | |
| 16 | 16 | test("the doc covers each adversary, the internal calls and honeypots", () => { |
test/threats-sections-linked.test.ts added +49
| @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ | ||
| 1 | /** | |
| 2 | * docs/THREATS.md is an index of its sections, each a file in docs/threats/ (#15005): every link | |
| 3 | * names a file that is there and opens with the link's heading, every file there is linked once, | |
| 4 | * and the assembled document keeps each `## ` heading in the index's order. | |
| 5 | */ | |
| 6 | import { expect, test } from "bun:test"; | |
| 7 | import { readdirSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; | |
| 8 | import { join } from "node:path"; | |
| 9 | import { assembleThreats, readThreats, sectionLinks } from "../src/core/threats.ts"; | |
| 10 | ||
| 11 | const DOCS = join(import.meta.dir, "..", "docs"); | |
| 12 | const index = readFileSync(join(DOCS, "THREATS.md"), "utf8"); | |
| 13 | const links = sectionLinks(index); | |
| 14 | const files = readdirSync(join(DOCS, "threats")).filter((n) => n.endsWith(".md")).sort(); | |
| 15 | ||
| 16 | test("every section the index links is a file that opens with that heading", () => { | |
| 17 | expect(links.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); | |
| 18 | const missing = links.filter((l) => !files.includes(l.file)).map((l) => l.file); | |
| 19 | expect(missing).toEqual([]); | |
| 20 | for (const l of links) { | |
| 21 | const first = readFileSync(join(DOCS, "threats", l.file), "utf8").split("\n")[0]; | |
| 22 | expect(first, l.file).toBe(`## ${l.heading}`); | |
| 23 | } | |
| 24 | }); | |
| 25 | ||
| 26 | test("every file in docs/threats/ is linked from the index, once", () => { | |
| 27 | const linked = links.map((l) => l.file); | |
| 28 | expect(new Set(linked).size).toBe(linked.length); | |
| 29 | expect(files.filter((f) => !linked.includes(f))).toEqual([]); | |
| 30 | }); | |
| 31 | ||
| 32 | test("the index holds no section of its own; each section's file holds exactly one", () => { | |
| 33 | expect(index.split("\n").filter((l) => l.startsWith("## "))).toEqual([]); | |
| 34 | for (const f of files) { | |
| 35 | const heads = readFileSync(join(DOCS, "threats", f), "utf8").split("\n").filter((l) => l.startsWith("## ")); | |
| 36 | expect(heads.length, f).toBe(1); | |
| 37 | } | |
| 38 | }); | |
| 39 | ||
| 40 | test("the assembled document has each heading once, in the index's order", () => { | |
| 41 | const heads = readThreats().split("\n").filter((l) => l.startsWith("## ")).map((l) => l.slice(3)); | |
| 42 | expect(heads).toEqual(links.map((l) => l.heading)); | |
| 43 | }); | |
| 44 | ||
| 45 | test("assembly keeps the preamble and joins the linked files with one blank line", () => { | |
| 46 | const idx = "# T\n\nWhy.\n\n- [A](threats/a.md)\n- [B](threats/b.md)\n"; | |
| 47 | const read = (f: string): string => ({ "a.md": "## A\n\n- one\n", "b.md": "## B\n\n- two\n\n" })[f] ?? ""; | |
| 48 | expect(assembleThreats(idx, read)).toBe("# T\n\nWhy.\n\n## A\n\n- one\n\n## B\n\n- two\n"); | |
| 49 | }); |
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