OAuth revoke
A harness that disconnects ends its own token: POST /oauth/revoke
(RFC 7009). Both /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server and
/.well-known/openid-configuration name it as revocation_endpoint.
Calling it
curl -X POST https://<forge>/oauth/revoke -d token=<access_token>
The body is a form (token=…) or, leniently, JSON ({"token":"…"}), at most
16 KiB. No cookie and no client secret: the token is the proof.
It answers an empty 200 for every token it is given: one it ended, an
unknown one, a repeat, and a personal token made in settings (which it does
not touch). It never says whether the token existed. 413 for a body past
the cap; 429 with Retry-After past 60 requests a minute per client address
(IPv6 by its /64) or 600 a minute across the forge.
A revoked token is refused at once by /api/v1 and /mcp, and a
token.deleted event (via: oauth_revoke) lands in the audit trail.
What it can end
Only tokens the OAuth token endpoint minted: each is marked in the
oauth_token table, which cascades away with the token. Tokens minted before
that migration carry no mark and cannot be revoked here; end them in settings.
The person's side
No new screen is needed. A person's connected harness is a row in the token
list (the settings page, and the terminal's sign-ins screen with d), which already deletes any
token, OAuth-minted or personal; deleting it removes its oauth_token row by
cascade, and the harness's next call is refused.