Clouds are capacity, never dependency

The rule:

  1. The forge runs, backs up and restores with no vendor attached. Every

vendor is an addition; unplugging all of them leaves a working forge.

  1. What leaves through a vendor is end-to-end encrypted or already public.

A vendor never holds a readable secret, session or private repository.

  1. Every use is declared and has a way back. Nothing reaches a vendor

unless cloud.json says so, and each use names how to leave it (why says what it is for; the module that makes the call documents its exit).

cloud.json

Beside forge.json, at the root of the repository:

{ "uses": [{ "vendor": "s3", "use": "backup", "why": "off-machine copy of the encrypted snapshot" }] }

No file means no uses. A malformed file is refused with one sentence (parseCloud, src/apps/manifest.ts) and grants nothing.

The gate

mayUse(declared, vendor, use) in src/apps/cloud.ts is the only way a vendor call is allowed. Later steps call it before every vendor request; it is false unless that exact vendor and use are declared.

A key attached under Settings → Cloud accounts is handed to a run only when the run's repository declares the key's vendor. A provider's vendor is VENDOR_OF in src/cloud/providers.ts: the provider's own name, except that AWS and Backblaze B2 are s3 (both speak the S3 interface).

Cloud accounts

Settings → Cloud accounts (admins) holds provider keys — Cloudflare, DigitalOcean, AWS, Azure, Fly, Backblaze, GitHub, Vercel — sealed and write-only. Pasting one makes the forge check it with read-only calls (listed in the header of src/cloud/providers.ts) and say what it can see; a key the provider rejects is not stored. It is sealed at forge scope as CLOUD_<PROVIDER>_<NAME> (secret names are capitals, so cloudflare/main is CLOUD_CLOUDFLARE_MAIN). The page lists names, the last check, and which run last opened each key; "Every read" lists each open, and a run's page lists the secrets it held. A run gets a key by declaring it like any secret. Write allowed is off by default: a run that adds writes: yes to its front-matter and declares a cloud key whose switch is off fails with that reason. The switch gates the forge's hand-out, not the key — a provider key that can write still can, so paste read-only keys. Audit reads one account and opens one [audit] issue per finding (unattached volumes, powered-off droplets, unassociated IPs, never-active zones) with a monthly saving estimate, skipping findings already open. It runs in the forge, not as a crew run; AWS audits look at us-east-1 only; over-provisioned droplets and forgotten DNS records need metrics or resolution and are not attempted; Backblaze, GitHub and Vercel audits find nothing yet. No dependency was added.

Each account can be rotated (the new value is checked, then replaces the old) and renamed (re-sealed under the new name, write switch kept). Each says in one line what it is used for now — the cloud.json declarations on the default branch of the first 100 repositories the admin can see, cached a minute — and carries a "bring it home" note (HOME in src/cloud/declared.ts). Every vendor request goes through src/cloud/gate.ts: an admin's verify or audit is audited as the operator; a hand-out of a key to a run is allowed only if that repository's cloud.json declares the key's vendor (VENDOR_OF: the provider's name, but AWS and Backblaze are s3), and an undeclared one is refused before the key is opened. One cloud_audit row per request (account, purpose, host and path, bytes out, when, allowed or refused — no token, no query) is listed at Settings → Cloud accounts → Every vendor call today. Rows are pruned past 90 days on every write; at is indexed. Left out: one token per vendor is not enforced (several names per vendor stay allowed), and an agent's own vendor calls beyond the hand-out are not metered. A forge admin reaches the same accounts in the terminal (: → Cloud accounts: each account with what it is used for, verified / last used and today's vendor calls; a attach, v verify, r rotate, n rename, x remove, w flip the write switch, A audit into an owner/repo, c every vendor call today (purpose, host and path, bytes out, allowed or refused), the token typed masked) and over MCP (cloud_accounts lists them with today's audit rows; cloud_account with verb attach, verify, rotate, rename, remove, allow_writes (with allowed) or audit (with repo) needs an admin-scope token). Both call actions/cloud.ts, neither ever shows a token, and anyone else is refused. A rename is refused when the account or the secret CLOUD_<PROVIDER>_<NAME> already exists.

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