Intent. Four to six salvagers divide a hold of numbered lots; each holds a secret per-lot valuation and offers are complete splits that bind on a quorum.
How it plays. The board is 12 lots. Every player is dealt a private valuation vector over those lots (totals differ, so the pie is not fixed). On your turn you offer a complete assignment of every lot to a player, or accept the standing offer, or pass; an offer binds when a quorum accepts, and everyone scores their own valuation of what they were given. A player left out of the coalition still receives whatever the accord gives them, usually nothing.
Where the tension is. Telling the truth about what you value lets the table find the split that is worth the most in total, which is the only way a deal clears the quorum — and the moment you have told it, everyone prices you: they know exactly how little they can pay you to keep you in.
Why it may not be the one. The tension is the textbook one (revelation versus hold-up in multilateral bargaining) and the honesty is all cheap talk: nothing in the engine can make a statement true, so a session is one long round of unverifiable assertions. It is also very close to games that already exist.
Opened as one of the three rule-sets the direction (#1) asks for, to be judged against the others.
Intent. Four to six salvagers divide a hold of numbered lots; each holds a secret per-lot valuation and offers are complete splits that bind on a quorum.
How it plays. The board is 12 lots. Every player is dealt a private valuation vector over those lots (totals differ, so the pie is not fixed). On your turn you offer a complete assignment of every lot to a player, or accept the standing offer, or pass; an offer binds when a quorum accepts, and everyone scores their own valuation of what they were given. A player left out of the coalition still receives whatever the accord gives them, usually nothing.
Where the tension is. Telling the truth about what you value lets the table find the split that is worth the most in total, which is the only way a deal clears the quorum — and the moment you have told it, everyone prices you: they know exactly how little they can pay you to keep you in.
Why it may not be the one. The tension is the textbook one (revelation versus hold-up in multilateral bargaining) and the honesty is all cheap talk: nothing in the engine can make a statement true, so a session is one long round of unverifiable assertions. It is also very close to games that already exist.
Opened as one of the three rule-sets the direction (#1) asks for, to be judged against the others.