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/goal /ultracode-workflows [RBAC-5] sign the Forgejo webhook bus (HMAC) — close event forgery #32

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Track/Wave: RBAC-5 · Wave G5 · Size S Repos: agents, mitosis Depends on: none

Why

POST /hook verifies no signature; anything reaching the port can forge agent-work events and trigger builds/runs. Precondition for trusting webhooks as the platform's growth-loop event bus.

Scope

Set a shared secret on the admin system hook; verify the HMAC in the /hook receiver (dispatcher.ts ~2704) before dispatch; seal the secret via fork_regen_secrets so it regenerates per-daughter.

Acceptance

A POST to /hook with missing/incorrect signature is rejected (4xx, no dispatch); a genuine Forgejo-signed event dispatches — validated by replaying a captured payload with a tampered signature.

Notes

Seam A (fork_regen_secrets) — late in the germination-scripts chain.

--- Part of the First Client Deploy → Governance roadmap. The owning agent may recurse into its own subagent team (ultracode workflow) if the task warrants. Honor the seam-serialization: land on a shared seam by rebase, and don't start a seam position until the prior one has merged.

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