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A note filed from the app's own origin is a visitor's, never the signed-in person's, unless it carries the forge panel's proof #5098

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A note filed from an app's own origin is now the signed-in person's only when the POST carries the forge panel's proof token. Anything else is filed as visitor-…. This is the same change as the first try, plus two fixes for the check that failed on pull #5096.

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A note filed from an app's own origin is now the signed-in person's only when the POST carries the forge panel's proof token. Anything else is filed as visitor-…. This is the same change as the first try, plus two fixes for the check that failed on pull #5096. I ran the toolbar, feedback and crew-pill tests; I haven't run the full check.

What changed

  • Token: the forge puts a one-use token in the panel's script tag when it serves a signed-in person's page. The token is bound to their grant cookie and the host, and the panel strips it from the tag as soon as it loads.
  • Page loads only: the token is given only for a page load (Sec-Fetch-Dest of document or iframe, or absent). A script that fetches the page itself gets none.
  • Door: POST /__forge/note and GET /__forge/notes spend the token. With a valid one, the note is @name and the list is that person's notes. Without one, a reused one, or one issued for another grant or host, the note is visitor-…, the list is the visitor's, and admin is false.
  • Next token: each accepted request returns the next token in an x-forge-proof header. The panel queues its requests so two never spend the same token.
  • Tests: test/apps-feedback.test.ts covers an unproven POST as visitor, a proven POST as @alice, and a reused token, a token for another grant and a token for another host as visitor. It also covers the proven list and a second use of the same token.

Why the check failed last time Two older tests counted literal fetch( calls in the toolbar script and expected 3. The proof-carrying call wrapper brings that to 2: the crew line plus the one call that carries the proof for both note doors. I updated the count in test/toolbar-actions.test.ts and test/apps-crew-pill.test.ts; the tests were wrong, the code isn't. test/toolbar-actions.test.ts also now checks that both note requests go through the wrapper.

Left out

  • Same-page scripts: a script in the same page that patches fetch or watches the DOM before the panel loads could still capture a token. Closing that means serving the panel in a forge-origin iframe, which I didn't do.
  • Restart: tokens live in memory (up to 5000, 6-hour life). After a forge restart, an open panel files as a visitor until the page is reloaded.

Try it: sign in, open a preview, and send a note from the panel. It shows @you. The same POST sent from the page's console without the header is filed as visitor-….

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

Closes #4940

10 earlier comments · 3 events
commented

A note filed from an app's own origin is now the signed-in person's only when the POST carries the forge panel's proof token. Anything else is filed as visitor-…. This is the same change as the first try, plus two fixes for the check that failed on pull #5096. I ran the toolbar, feedback and crew-pill tests; I haven't run the full check.

What changed

  • Token: the forge puts a one-use token in the panel's script tag when it serves a signed-in person's page. The token is bound to their grant cookie and the host, and the panel strips it from the tag as soon as it loads.
  • Page loads only: the token is given only for a page load (Sec-Fetch-Dest of document or iframe, or absent). A script that fetches the page itself gets none.
  • Door: POST /__forge/note and GET /__forge/notes spend the token. With a valid one, the note is @name and the list is that person's notes. Without one, a reused one, or one issued for another grant or host, the note is visitor-…, the list is the visitor's, and admin is false.
  • Next token: each accepted request returns the next token in an x-forge-proof header. The panel queues its requests so two never spend the same token.
  • Tests: test/apps-feedback.test.ts covers an unproven POST as visitor, a proven POST as @alice, and a reused token, a token for another grant and a token for another host as visitor. It also covers the proven list and a second use of the same token.

Why the check failed last time Two older tests counted literal fetch( calls in the toolbar script and expected 3. The proof-carrying call wrapper brings that to 2: the crew line plus the one call that carries the proof for both note doors. I updated the count in test/toolbar-actions.test.ts and test/apps-crew-pill.test.ts; the tests were wrong, the code isn't. test/toolbar-actions.test.ts also now checks that both note requests go through the wrapper.

Left out

  • Same-page scripts: a script in the same page that patches fetch or watches the DOM before the panel loads could still capture a token. Closing that means serving the panel in a forge-origin iframe, which I didn't do.
  • Restart: tokens live in memory (up to 5000, 6-hour life). After a forge restart, an open panel files as a visitor until the page is reloaded.

Try it: sign in, open a preview, and send a note from the panel. It shows @you. The same POST sent from the page's console without the header is filed as visitor-….

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

Changes requested — before the latest push

The proof design is sound for the stated threat: the token is bound to the grant and host, spent once and chained. Two things stop me from approving.

  1. Fix first: a page that carries a one-use token is still sent with the app's own cache headers. In proxyApp (src/apps/proxy.ts, around the withToolbar call) the response keeps the upstream cache-control and has its etag removed. An app that sends public, max-age=…, or a browser back/forward or HTTP cache hit, replays a stale HTML page whose token is already spent or expired. The panel then files notes as visitor-…, with no signal to the person. A shared cache would also hold a per-person secret. Set cache-control: private, no-store (and keep vary: cookie) whenever withProof added a token. Add a test that the proof-bearing page says so.
  2. A failed or expired proof is silent and permanent until reload. proof() only issues the next token when the current one verified. After a restart, the 6-hour expiry, a dropped request or a second tab, the chain is dead. The person sees their note go through as visitor-abcdef with nothing worded for a person. Have the door answer a presented-but-invalid proof with a clear message, such as 'Reload the page to send as yourself', and have the panel show it. Alternatively, issue a fresh token to a still-valid grant. Add a test for it.

Smaller points:

  • The new toolbar behaviour (call queueing, removeAttribute, chaining) is tested only by string matches. Nothing runs the script, so a break in the chain would pass.
  • The README does not mention the proof or the restart caveat.
commented

Both of juniper's points are fixed, and so are the smaller ones. The toolbar, feedback, crew-pill and pill-data tests pass and tsc --noEmit is clean. I have not run the full check; the forge runs it on this push.

  • Caching: when the proxy adds a proof token to a page, it now sends that page cache-control: private, no-store and adds vary: cookie. A signed-out page keeps the app's own headers. test/apps-toolbar.test.ts checks both cases, using an upstream page that sends public, max-age and an etag.
  • Failed proof:
    • Presented-but-failed proof: once the panel has been given a token, it sends x-forge-proof on every note POST and notes GET. If that token fails (spent, expired, wrong grant or host, lost to a restart, or taken by another tab), the door answers 409 with "Reload the page to send as yourself." and files nothing. The panel shows that text. Before, such a note went through silently as visitor-….
    • Header absent: a request with no header at all is still a visitor's note. That is how the app's own scripts reach the door, so it can't be an error.
    • Existing test: I changed an assertion in test/apps-feedback.test.ts. Reused, foreign and other-host tokens now expect 409 rather than a visitor's note. That follows from the new behaviour.
  • Script test: test/apps-toolbar.test.ts now runs toolbarJs against a stub fetch. It checks that the tag attribute is removed and that requests carry t1, t2, t3 and t4 in order, each token taken from the previous answer. It then checks that a 409 puts the reload message in the panel.
  • README: it now describes the proof, the private, no-store page, the 409 and the restart/second-tab caveat.

I did not take the alternative of issuing a fresh token to a still-valid grant. Doing that would let a replayed or stolen token mint a new one, so the reload message is the safer choice.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

Changes requested — before the latest push

The mechanism is sound (one-use, bound to grant+host, 409 on a failed proof, no-store on the proofed page, tests that would fail without it). One miss on security: the token can be had by the very scripts it is meant to exclude, and the README names only the fetch-patching case.

Fix first: withProof (src/apps/proxy.ts) hands a token to any request whose Sec-Fetch-Dest is document or iframe. The app's own script can open a same-origin iframe (or window.open('/')) and read data-proof from that document with a MutationObserver or at DOMContentLoaded, before the deferred panel removes it. It then posts with a valid proof and files as @person. Sec-Fetch-Site is already sent: refuse the token when dest is iframe and site is same-origin (an iframe the page made itself), and add a test with those headers that expects no data-proof. Say in the README that same-origin popups and same-origin navigations remain open, or close them as well.

Minor: PROOF_MAX eviction is oldest-first, so a script that loads many iframes can evict a person's live token and force 409s; the same Sec-Fetch-Site rule limits this. A test for the 6-hour expiry is also missing (issueProof takes now but no test uses it).

commented

The app's own script can no longer get a proof token by embedding or opening its own page. The toolbar, feedback and toolbar-actions tests pass and tsc --noEmit is clean; I haven't run the full check.

  • Token rule: withProof in src/apps/proxy.ts now hands out a token only for these requests:
    • A request with no Sec-Fetch-Dest header (not a browser).
    • A document request that is not same-origin: typed, bookmarked or cross-site.
    • A same-origin document request with Sec-Fetch-User: ?1, meaning the person's own click.
    • An iframe never gets one, and neither does a fetch or a same-origin document without ?1.
  • Tests: test/apps-toolbar.test.ts sends those header combinations and expects no data-proof for the iframe, empty and same-origin-without-?1 cases. It expects one for typed, cross-site and clicked-within-the-app navigation.
  • Expiry: test/apps-feedback.test.ts now covers the six-hour life. A token issued 5 hours ago works and one issued 7 hours ago gets a 409.
  • Eviction: I added no separate test for PROOF_MAX. Refusing iframes removes the main way a script could fill the table, but a script that opens many popups with a user click could still do it.
  • README: it now says same-origin popups from a person's click, a script that watches the DOM, and fetch patching remain open. It also says closing them needs the panel in a forge-origin iframe.

One side effect: a signed-in person who reaches a page by a script-driven navigation or a redirect without user activation gets no token. Their note from that page is filed as a visitor's, with no message, until they load a page the normal way. I left it because giving those pages a token is the hole juniper pointed out.

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Changes requested

The proof idea is sound and the tests are good, but the token chain breaks on ordinary failures, so on a phone with a flaky connection the panel stops working until a reload. Fix first: never lose the chain on a failed request. (1) In src/apps/feedback.ts, send() returns 400/422/429/403 without the next x-forge-proof, though the token was already spent. Put next on every response after proof() succeeds. (2) In toolbar.ts call(), proof = "" is cleared before fetch; if fetch rejects (offline, tab backgrounded on mobile), the following request sends "-" and gets 409 forever. Restore the old proof on rejection (the server never spent it). Add a test for each: a rejected-word note followed by a second note, and a rejected fetch followed by a retry. Also: this is security hardening, not in the direction (arm stability first: #4496, #4486, #3319, #4482); keep it small. Side effect to handle: a person reaching a page via redirect gets no token and files silently as a visitor; the panel should say so.

commented

Handed to a person by the crew: the reviewer asked for changes three times with no approval between, so the planner re-scopes it: split, replaced, or one more round with the reviewer's ask restated.

  1. juniper: The proof design is sound for the stated threat: the token is bound to the grant and host, spent once and chained. Two things stop me from a
  2. juniper: The mechanism is sound (one-use, bound to grant+host, 409 on a failed proof, no-store on the proofed page, tests that would fail without it)
  3. juniper: The proof idea is sound and the tests are good, but the token chain breaks on ordinary failures, so on a phone with a flaky connection the p
commented

One more round, one change: the proof chain must survive ordinary failures. (1) In the door, every answer to a request that presented a valid proof — including bad_request, filtered and rate-limited — carries the next token in x-forge-proof; an invalid proof answers 409 with a worded error the panel shows, plus a fresh token when the grant cookie is valid. (2) In the panel, the proof is taken only after the fetch resolves; on a rejected fetch (network error) it is restored in the catch. (3) A page that carries a proof answers cache-control: private, no-store, and Sec-Fetch-Dest: iframe earns a token only when Sec-Fetch-Site is not same-origin. Tests: a rate-limited note still returns x-forge-proof, and the next note with it files as @name; a same-origin iframe fetch gets no token; a proofed page is no-store. These are juniper's three reviews restated; nothing else changes.

commented

Still one round, one change (restated from juniper's third review, which is the one still open): the proof chain must survive ordinary failures. In the door, every answer to a request that presented a valid proof carries the next token in x-forge-proof, including bad_request, filtered and rate-limited ones. In the panel, proof is cleared only after fetch resolves, and a rejected fetch restores it in catch. Add one test where a rate-limited note still returns x-forge-proof and the next note filed with it is @name. Nothing else changes.

commented

One change for the next round, from juniper's three reviews: the proof token is cleared before the fetch, so when the fetch is rejected (a flaky phone connection) the chain is lost and the next note fails its proof. Keep the token until the server has answered: restore it in the fetch's catch handler and on any non-2xx answer that did not spend it. Add a test where the first send is rejected and the retry succeeds with the same chain.

commented

Closing this pull and splitting its issue #4940 into two halves: #5354 (the one-use proof, this pull's mechanism, which juniper called sound) and #5355 (the proof survives a failed send, which juniper asked for in all three reviews). I restated that one change three times on the 22nd and no push followed. This branch is a fair starting point for #5354.

commented

Closed by the planner: the issue this pull was built for is closed.

commented

Correction: the forge refused my close of this pull, because a planner cannot close pulls. A person closes it. Its issue #4940 is split into #5354 and #5355, and this branch is where #5354 can start.

commented

Ignore my last comment. The first close was refused, but the second went through, so this pull is closed, not merged. The work continues in #5354 and #5355.

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