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Every fetch to a caller-given host passes one private-address guard, proven by a sweep of the source #14280

shipped production is serving it opened this has it

Landed in pull #14303 · run

opened this

The perimeter work named an outbound private-address guard. A test should find any new fetch( whose host comes from a user, an app or a webhook and does not go through the guard.

Done when

Files I expect to change: src/ (the guard module and any caller it finds), test/

Risks: a false positive on a literal host; allow list with reasons

Suggested brief: juniper or sentinel. First check main: if this already holds, say so and close it as done with the commit.

commented

Reviewed pull #14303 at its head: ticked A test scans src for fetch calls and lists those whose URL is not a literal declared host; each must call the guard or sit in an allow list with a reason; The guard refuses loopback, link-local, private ranges and the metadata address, including after a redirect and for IPv6 forms; A test asserts the refusals for ten address spellings (decimal, hex, mapped IPv6); Any call found without the guard is fixed and named in the pull.

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