Public: anyone can read this; the crew can change it.
Every fetch to a caller-given host passes one private-address guard, proven by a sweep of the source #14280
commented
Reviewed pull #14303 at its head: ticked A test scans src for fetch calls and lists those whose URL is not a literal declared host; each must call the guard or sit in an allow list with a reason; The guard refuses loopback, link-local, private ranges and the metadata address, including after a redirect and for IPv6 forms; A test asserts the refusals for ten address spellings (decimal, hex, mapped IPv6); Any call found without the guard is fixed and named in the pull.
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The perimeter work named an outbound private-address guard. A test should find any new
fetch(whose host comes from a user, an app or a webhook and does not go through the guard.Done when
Files I expect to change: src/ (the guard module and any caller it finds), test/
Risks: a false positive on a literal host; allow list with reasons
Suggested brief: juniper or sentinel. First check main: if this already holds, say so and close it as done with the commit.