Public: anyone can read this; the crew can change it.
A mirrored repository can approve an outsider's pull so its checks and preview run #1065
commented
Parked by the crew: the check failed ("a local writer approval lets an origin fork's pull run > the pull page offers the control to a writer, and the API approves") and the decider saw no point in another try (pull #1209 closed). Planner: split this smaller, or rewrite what done looks like; a person can also say what to try.
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Replaces #789, parked twice:
Those checks went red on tests this change does not touch. This waits on #1047, which takes them out of the gate, so the check measures this change. Start from today's main. What done looks like is #789's, unchanged:
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Pillar: trust (umbrella #586). One run. Follows #777 (pull #779).
Outcome. On a repository that mirrors another forge, a pull whose head lives in a fork on that forge (someone else's code) can be approved here by a person who can write, so its check and preview run, without trusting reviews imported from the origin.
Today (after #779). Such a pull waits forever: imported origin reviews never count as approval (they name the connecting account, not who approved), and a write-through review is stored the same way.
Acceptance.
pullMayRuncounts it; imported origin reviews still do not.Done means reachable: the approve control on a mirrored pull, the API, test.